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Abstract
We study the persistent and adverse effects of colonial ethno-racial segregation on modern urban sorting patterns. After the conquest of Mesoamerica, Spaniards segregated natives into settlements called
Pueblos de Indios. By the end of colonial times, there were two types of settlements: Pueblos with
Indigenous inhabitants only and Pueblos with populations of diverse ancestry. We estimate the causal
impacts of Pueblos and the degree of success in the segregation policy on modern outcomes within
cities. We combine a research design that purges unobserved spatial heterogeneity with a novel instrumental variable to deal with endogeneity. We show that urban areas closer to segregated Pueblos have
lower levels of human capital relative to blocks near Pueblos with multi-ancestry individuals. While
segregated Pueblos do not lead to modern agglomerations of Indigenous or Afro-Mexican individuals,
mixed-race individuals with darker skin tones gather around former Pueblos where segregation was
successful. We also find that individuals living nearby such areas have lower intergenerational mobility. We conclude that colonial segregation shifts from a targeted ethno-racial group to individuals who
currently have markers of low socioeconomic status or specific phenotypes in Mexico.
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1

Introduction

Segregation policies shaping the spatial distribution of individuals and economic activity in urban contexts
might not repeat themselves, but they echo in the present. A large body of literature shows the persistent
effects of historical institutions on the economic outcomes we observe across and within countries (Nunn,
2014, 2020). Urban economics has recently emphasized the relevance of historical events to explain why
some cities or regions grow and the features of spatial organization within cities (Hanlon & Heblich, 2022;
Lin & Rauch, 2022).
The effects of urban historical institutions persist over time; however, they are highly context-dependent.
This literature concentrates on the U.S., showing that racial segregation in the past has lasting effects
on the originally targeted group (Shertzer et al., 2021). Does this result hold in a society where race
is not clearly defined in specific categories as in the U.S.? If so, how does the lasting impact of urban
segregation policies evolve as the original racial identities shift from categorical to continuous divisions?
Do colonial segregation policies have persistent effects within cities? This work aims to answer these
questions.
This paper provides causal evidence of the persistent effects of an ethno-racial colonial segregation policy
on city structure in contemporary Mexico at highly granular levels. Precisely, we analyze how Spanish
colonial institutions which congregated Indigenous individuals in specific settlements, known as Pueblos
de Indios, influence modern population patterns in Mexican cities. Our results show that the persistent
effects of historical segregation policies on sorting patterns are related to individuals with lower living
standards. Moreover, these effects shift from one group to another.
The Pueblos de Indios were established between the 1530s and 1630s, and most lasted by the end of colonial times. They aimed to congregate the native population in the urban space. However, the segregation
policy was sometimes unsuccessful: due to both commercial and labor interactions with the Spanish population living in colonial cities, some Pueblos had inhabitants of native, Mestizo (i.e., individuals with
Spanish and Indigenous ancestry), and African descent (Tanck de Estrada et al., 2005; Castro-Gutierrez,
2013b; Alvarez-Icaza-Longoria, 2013). We call these settlements Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos. In
other cases, the colonial segregation was successful: some Pueblos were inhabited only by Indigenous
individuals. Therefore, we denominate such settlements Indigenous-Only Pueblos.
The main objectives of our empirical analysis are to show that Pueblos shape modern Mexican cities
and that the two types of Pueblos have different impacts on the human capital and housing outcomes
of urban blocks in Mexico. For our analysis, we combine two datasets. The first contains the location
of more than 4,000 Pueblos across Mexico (Tanck de Estrada et al., 2005). The second dataset is the
georeferenced Census of 2020, with information on all urban blocks in Mexican metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs). We use this data in the absence of a panel dataset that tracks individuals across different
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neighborhoods for an extended period.1
We document that the spatial policy that established Pueblos de Indios has persistent impacts on the
contemporary spatial distribution within cities. We illustrate that city blocks closer to Pueblos de Indios have a higher population density compared to those urban blocks located far from Pueblos. The
results suggests that Pueblos de Indios generated multi-centric city patterns or secondary population
agglomerations within Mexican cities.
Exploiting the mixed success of the segregation policies that established the Pueblos de Indios, we go one
step further and disentangle the heterogeneous effects of the colonial institution. More specifically, we
analyze the persistent impact of fully segregated Indigenous-Only Pueblos on the economic outcomes of
contemporary urban blocks. We match every block to the nearest Pueblo de Indios. Then, we compare two
types of urban blocks: those blocks that are closest to an Indigenous-Only Pueblo (i.e., fully segregated
colonial settlement) vs. the city blocks nearest to an Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblo (i.e., not fully
segregated colonial settlement).
In the absence of clear borders for Pueblos de Indios and given the presence of multiple Pueblos within
cities, we use a cross-sectional analysis at the block level. The evaluation of the causal impact of fully
segregated Indigenous-Only Pueblos on the contemporary economic outcomes in urban blocks faces two
main challenges. First, Pueblos location was not random. Thus, our estimates can be influenced by
selection into locational fundamentals (Davis & Weinstein, 2002). We document that Indigenous-Only
Pueblos’ and Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos’ locational fundamentals do not differ after accounting for
MSA fixed effects. Nonetheless, historical spatial unobserved factors could bias our estimates.
We deal with the endogeneity sources by using both spatial first-differences (SFD) (Druckenmiller &
Hsiang, 2019) and instrumental variables research design. SFD purges out unobserved spatial heterogeneity. To address the remaining concerns of unobserved heterogeneity, we introduce a novel instrumental variable. We exploit a source of contemporary exogenous variation: the blocks´ distance to the
metropolitan statistical area administrative limits (not the same as municipal boundaries nor city limits).
In order to fulfill its segregation purpose, Indigenous-Only Pueblo settlements tended to be located far
away from colonial cities, thus having fewer economic and social interactions. (Castro-Gutierrez, 2013b;
Nemser, 2017). Our instrumental variable exploits the historical spatial pattern. The relevance of our
instrument relies on the fact that an urban block closer to the MSAs administrative boundaries is more
likely to be closer to an Indigenous-Only Pueblo. On the contrary, urban blocks further away are more
likely to be closer to Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos.
1
Mexico’s official statistical agency does not have publicly available historical or modern datasets that track individuals across different Census. This is different compared to the United States, in which federal law allows U.S. Census Bureau to reveal public data 72 years after a Census was implemented. Furthermore, unlike in the United States, there are
no datasets that track a sample of individuals across time with knowledge of their precise location (i.e., neighborhood or
census tract). Although the Mexican Family Survey tracks individuals across time, it is not possible to observe the exact
location of individuals due to confidentiality issues. Moreover, this survey is not representative at the city level.
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MSA boundaries are exogenous to the economic circumstances of an urban block. In the Mexican case,
the inclusion of a municipality in a MSA considers commuting patterns only (SEDATU, 2015). As argued
by Ch et al. (2021), both the administrative limits and the commuting patterns are arbitrary measures
of the MSAs real sprawl. Our instrument might affect economic outcomes through other variables, thus
violating the exclusion restriction. We show, nonetheless, that our instrument is plausibly exogenous
once controlling for observables (Conley et al., 2012). Furthermore, we use SFD to purge any remaining
unobserved spatial heterogeneity that might violate the exclusion restriction and combine it with a twostage least square estimation method.
Our results show that households residing in urban blocks near former Indigenous-Only Pueblos have persistent and adverse effects on living standards compared to urban blocks close to Heterogenous-Ancestry
Pueblos. The estimates are sizable. Being closer to a successfully segregated Pueblo leads to between
minus 6.2 and minus 1.9 years of schooling. It also increases between 0.1 to 0.7 people per room in the
blocks nearby Indigenous-Only Pueblos.
While it is natural to think the persistence mechanism is an agglomeration of the previously segregated
group, we find otherwise. Studies for the U.S. have recently found that segregation and zoning policies of
the XXth century have persistent effects on contemporary racial segregation (Shertzer et al., 2021). We
show that our findings are not driven by the agglomeration of Indigenous individuals or Afro-Mexicans
in blocks nearby Indigenous-Only Pueblos. The fact that there is no persistence in the targeted group
is unsurprising. First, most of the Mexican population define themselves as Mestizos: an ethno-racial
category for individuals with both Indigenous and Spaniards ancestry (Woo-Mora, 2022). Second, Indigenous and Afro-origin ethnic identities are especially salient in specific regions or the rural context.2
Our results show that the spatial consequences of colonial segregation policies that targeted Indigenous
individuals persist, even when they do not live around Pueblos.
Results show, however, that individuals living in blocks closer to Indigenous-Only Pueblos have darker
skin tones. We leverage a survey with information on skin tone and geographic location for a sample
of individuals living in Mexico City, the largest and densest urban area in the country. Our findings
indicate that even if the group discriminated in the past no longer lives in the area where a segregation
policy was implemented, the policy can still negatively impact centuries later on other groups. In our
case, individuals with similar phenotypical characteristics to the group targeted centuries before.3
Lastly, we show that the colonial segregation policies impede upward intergenerational social mobility.
Using information of rank-to-rank regressions, we provide evidence that individuals living nearby formerly
2
In Mexico, most of the Indigenous population lives in rural areas. According to CONEVAL (2014), 50 percent of Indigenous people in Mexico live in towns of 2,500 inhabitants or less, while only 20 percent live in cities with more than
100,000 people. Regarding Afro-origin Mexicans, the 2020 census is the first to explicitly ask whether the surveyed population considers they have Afro-Mexican ancestry.
3
Tanck de Estrada et al. (2005). A compilation of history papers edited by Castro-Gutierrez (2013c) shows that the
lack of success of Spanish authorities’ segregation policies led to a process of mestizaje due to mixed marriages between
the Indigenous, Spanish, and African population in colonial times.
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segregated Pueblos experience less social mobility than those living in areas where colonial segregation
failed. Our estimates suggest that individuals would have to increase between 6 and 7.6 percentiles their
parents’ rank to eliminate the penalty of living nearby Indigenous-Only Pueblos.
We make five contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the urban economics literature,
specifically existing work on segregation in a non-U.S. context. Second, we further prove that segregation
policies can persist over centuries, thus influencing the within-city structure and sorting patterns. Third,
we show that segregation can prevail and transmute: from an originally targeted group to other ethnoracial groups with some phenotypical characteristics similar to the targeted group. Fourth, we provide
evidence that historical segregation can indirectly affect individuals’ well-being, thus affecting social
mobility patterns. Fifth, we contribute to the literature on the persistent effects of colonial institutions
in Latin America.
Our work is closely related to recent studies on segregation by race or income in cities. This includes
evidence of racial segregation and sorting patterns in U.S. cities. (Ananat, 2011; Baum-Snow & Lutz,
2011; Boustan, 2010; Boustan & Margo, 2013; Brinkman & Lin, 2019; Collins & Margo, 2007; Cook et al.,
2020; Cutler et al., 1999; De la Roca et al., 2018; Gil & Marion, 2018; Borland et al., 2012; Logan &
Parman, 2017b,a; Quigley & Raphael, 2008; Shertzer et al., 2021, 2016; Rothstein, 2018; Villarreal, 2014;
Wright, 2018). For developing nations, however, there is a scarcity of studies regarding modern sorting
patters, with some research on metropolitan areas in Latin America, (Aliaga-Linares & Alvarez-Rivadulla,
2010; Medina et al., 2008; Perez-Perez et al., 2021; Velazquez-Cabrera, 2021; Tsivadinis, 2019; Warnes,
2020), South Africa (Christopher, 2001) or India (Bharathi et al., 2019a,b; Harari, 2020).
We complement the previous literature in two ways. First, we find segregation patterns can persist for
centuries instead of decades, as the empirical studies for the U.S. show (Shertzer et al., 2021). Second, the
segregation patterns are not across two different ethno-racial groups but within the same broad ethnoracial category, the Mestizos in Mexico’s Census. In our context, data shows that the original group
targeted by Spanish colonial policies, Indigenous, no longer lives near the Pueblos. Instead, we show
that ‘racialized’ individuals, or individuals with phenotypical characteristics more similar to Indigenous,
“inherit” the segregation patterns.
Our work is related to studies on the historical persistence between regions and within cities caused by
geography, political changes, transportation, or social events (Allen & Donaldson, 2022; Alhfeldt et al.,
2015; Ambrus et al., 2020; Bleakley & Lin, 2012; Brooks et al., 2020; Brooks & Lutz, 2019; Davis &
Weinstein, 2002; Hanlon & Heblich, 2022; Heblich et al., 2021; Lin & Rauch, 2022; Nitsch & Wolf, 2013;
Redding et al., 2011; Rothstein, 2018). We complement the previous work by deepening the studies of
cities’ structure path-dependence in developing nations.
A few studies for Latin America focus on cities or regions. Previous work has shown that trade can shape
the patterns of city growth in the region (Ellingsen, 2021; Alix-Garcia & Sellars, 2020). Other work
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has focused on the role of land concentration in rural areas, Alix-Garcia & Sellars (2018). The previous
literature leaves aside the question of how colonial policies shape the spatial patterns of the population
across neighborhoods within cities, which we address in this paper.
More broadly, this paper is related to the literature on the role of historical institutions in Latin America
(Artiles, 2020; Coatsworth, 2005; Dell, 2010; Fujiwara et al., 2019; Maloney & Valencia Caicedo, 2016;
Valencia Caicedo, 2019; Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000; Waldinger, 2017).4 Specifically, our work is closely
related to the literature focused on the role of Indigenous institutions in Mexico’s development outcomes
(Arias et al., 2014; Dı́az-Cayeros & Jha, 2016; Dı́az-Cayeros, 2011; Elizalde et al., 2021; Elizalde, 2020).
Two papers have analyzed the Pueblos de Indios in Mexico. Arteaga (2018) analyzes Pueblos de Indios
from an institutional perspective for rural and urban areas. Woo-Mora (2020) documents the longterm negative impacts of a single Indigenous-Only Pueblo on the economic and cultural outcomes in the
neighborhoods of a single city (Guadalajara). We depart from existing work by analyzing the effect of
Pueblos in all Mexican MSAs and by considering how the heterogeneity of the colonial segregation policy
of the Pueblos de Indios impacts urban sorting patterns.
Also, our paper links to the existing literature on racial disparities in Latin America. In Mexico, racial
disparities are salient across broad ethno-racial groups (for instance, between Mestizos and Indigenous),
but also within each of these groups (Woo-Mora, 2022). This feature differs from the U.S. context,
where “race was clearly defined, categorical, and based primarily on descent” Dixon & Telles (2017). In
Mexico, ‘racialization’ goes not through ethnic-categories but other markers. For instance, phenotypical
characteristics, such as skin tone. Skin tone impact labor market outcomes (Arceo-Gomez & CamposVazquez, 2014), education (Campos Vazquez & Medina-Cortina, 2018), or social mobility opportunities
(Campos-Vazquez & Medina-Cortina, 2019; Monroy-Gomez-Franco et al., 2021; Woo-Mora, 2022). This
work bridges the colonial institutions segregated by ethno-racial groups, with their impacts on modern
segregation by skin tone and on the sorting of lower-income individuals. The results complement the
previous literature by showing that current skin tone disparities relate to colonial segregation policies
based on ethno-racial dimensions.
Lastly, we complement the literature on social mobility. Previous literature has underlined the importance of neighborhoods for intergenerational mobility in the United States (Chyn, 2018; Chetty, 2016;
Chetty & Hendren, 2018a,b). In Mexico, Monroy-Gómez-Franco & Vélez-Grajales (2020) shows there is
heterogeneity in social mobility both by region and skin tone. We complement the previous studies by
finding another source of heterogeneity within cities.
We proceed in the following way: Section 2 provides historical context regarding the Pueblos de Indios,
Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 highlights the two empirical approaches, Section 5 reports the
results, and Section 6 concludes.
4

Some authors suggest that the impact of historical institutions on contemporary outcomes in Latin America are
overemphasized (Abad, 2013; Abad & Maurer, 2019).
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2

Historical Context

This section discusses two historical aspects of Indigenous settlements in Mexico. First, we describe the
spatial structure of Indigenous settlements before the colonial regime. Some of these settlements became
Pueblos de Indios under Spanish rule. Second, we outline the colonial institution officially named Pueblos
de Indios or Repúblicas de Indios. We provide a timeline in figure 1 to illustrate the implementation of
Pueblos de Indios’ in the context of major historical events.

Pe
r

os
Pu
eb
l

sis
t

en
t

im

pa
c

en

ts

d

of

of

of
en
de
nc
e:

le
ct
io
n

Late 1700s

In
de
p

ol
on
ia
C

em
pl
Im

1538 − 1635

ld
at
a

en
ta
tio

n

co
l

of

t
nq
ue
s
co
ish
an

Sp

1518 − 1521

Pu
eb
lo
s

Pu
e

de
Pu
eb
lo

ur
e
uc
t
tr
ls
tia
sp
a
al
ni
lo
co
ePr

< 1517

bl
os

In
di
os

Figure 1: Timeline for Pueblos de Indios

1821

Today

Notes: Authors’ own elaboration.

2.1

Pre-Colonial History of Urban Space

The origins of ancient cultures in Mesoamerica date back to 7200 B.C. (MacNeish, 1964). Mesoamerica
was situated where Mexico and Central America are today. The spatial and political structures were
diverse, ranging from stateless people, city-states, and a congeries of empires (Knight, 2002). However,
the ancient cultures’ political, social, and economic organization was transformed in 1521, when Spaniards
conquered Mesoamerica, and it became colonial New Spain. As a result, the Spanish rule reshaped the
spatial Indigenous organization.
Whereas the spatial structure was diverse in size and relevance, most settlements in Mesoamerica consisted
of small political units called calpullis. These were at the bottom of the political organization, and it
comprised different families living in one place, creating a clan. In some cases, calpullis controlled
small geographical areas. At the same time, they could also be part of extensive settlements or states.
Through warfare or resources, some states were able to dominate other regions that were subjected to
taxation, known as tributo (Gerhard, 1972).5 These few dominating states were called empires, the most
representative one being the Aztec Empire located in the central valley of Mexico with Tenochtitlan as
the center (located where Mexico City is now). Later on, the Spanish would replicate this taxation system
during colonial times (Granados, 2013).
According to Gerhard (1972), large settlements in the pre-colonial period, such as Tenochtitlan and other
5

This tributo was a payment for protection or imposed after a conflict between the Aztecs and the dominated society.
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empires, were rare. Instead, archeological evidence points out that pre-colonial cities consisted of primary
settlements or communal centers with a market, a temple, and the residences of nobility surrounded
by subordinates (Calnek, 1976; Alcántara, 2004; Lockhart, 1992; Gerhard, 1972). Furthermore, these
settlements often had a nuclear pattern where density decreased from the center towards the periphery
of the state (Sanders, 1956; Hirth, 2012).
The first two decades right after the conquest of the Aztec empire were characterized by conflicts between
Spaniards and natives, so the Spaniards did not attempt to modify the scattered patterns of Indigenous
settlements immediately. Later on, in 1538, they implemented a spatial policy described in the next
subsection. Although a few Indigenous settlements, such as Tenochtitlan, were transformed into Spanish
cities due to their geographic location. Often, the Spanish founded their towns in fertile valleys and
areas not previously populated by the Indigenous population or that the Indigenous societies had deemed
inconvenient (Gerhard, 1972; Scholes & Adams, 1961).

2.2

The Conquest and the Institutional Context of the Pueblos de Indios

The conquest by the Spaniards started in 1518 and concluded in 1521 with the fall of the Aztec empire.
Alliances between Spaniards and rivals of the Aztecs aided the swift subjugation of the empire. This
rapid conquest was a considerable shock to the political organization of pre-colonial settlements (Knight,
2002). However, the real political accomplishment of the Spanish conquerors was not the conquest itself
but rather their capacity to politically control the Indigenous settlements by “recycling” the same political
contract the Indigenous empires had used (Arteaga, 2018).
During and after the conquest, Spaniards exerted violence in different forms to dominate the native
populations.6 In this study, we are particularly interested in one of these violent processes that manifested
in the restructuring of the urban space: the Pueblos de Indios institution. From 1538 to 1635, the
Spaniards executed a new urban space policy to achieve local concentration and reduction. This policy
aimed to reallocate dispersed Indigenous populations across the territory into centralized towns. The
objectives were the “urbanization” of the native population and the geometrization of the colonial space
(Nemser, 2017).
In 1538, the Spanish Crown enacted a law creating the institution of Repúblicas de Indios (Tribunal
Supremo de Justicia, 1841). De jure, such institution gave Indigenous communities rights over land and
permitted some extent of self-government. Later on, spatial units with such Indigenous governing bodies
were known as Pueblos de Indios. De facto, the communities were complex institutions: they were both
a hostile place where Indigenous people had to comply with specific duties and taxes as well as a space
6
One of the first significant changes in the political administration was made by the conquerors. Between 1521 and
1524, they allocated to themselves central Indigenous territories called encomiendas. Each encomienda was supervised by
an encomendero, a Spaniard who extracted resources and services from the population under his control (Nemser, 2017;
Rionda Ramı́rez, 2012). This organization replicated the tributo that the Aztecs and Mayan empires collected during precolonial times. The encomiendas experienced several transformations and ultimately declined as other viable economic
systems became more efficient in extracting resources.
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where they could participate in their communities, maintain common goods, and celebrate their festivities
(Castro-Gutierrez, 2013a). Moreover, they had autonomy regarding the land tenure (Van Young, 1984).
The Pueblos de Indios were useful for the Spanish because they also served for public administration
and local governance purposes including taxation, provision of public goods, and administrative records
(Castro-Gutierrez, 2013b; Granados, 2013; Tanck de Estrada, 2018). Nevertheless, beyond its formal
administrative purposes, Pueblos de Indios served as a segregation policy (Nemser, 2017).
There are different origins of the Pueblos de Indios: they emerged from pre-existing Indigenous settlements (Arteaga, 2018), segregated towns artificially created by the Spaniards or the migrant Indigenous
population during colonial times (Woo-Mora, 2020; Loreto-López, 2013).7 Moreover, there are historical
documents outlining that given social and economic dynamics there were two different kinds of Pueblos. In one case, Pueblos de Indios were relatively isolated from interactions with Spanish Peninsulares
or Criollos (descendants of Spanish born in the Americas). As Castro-Gutierrez (2013b) documents,
sometimes the isolated Pueblos saw a Spanish person only once a year for the collection of taxes for
the Spanish Kingdom. The other case refers to those Pueblos that became part of the colonial cities,
as Lara-Cisneros (2013), Castro-Gutierrez (2013b), and Tanck de Estrada (2018) document. Pueblos of
the second type constantly interacted with Mestizos, Criollos, and Spanish Peninsulares. Such interactions were so frequent that in some cases the inhabitants of some Pueblos sold their land to Spanish
Peninsulares, Criollos, or Mestizos looking for affordable housing.
What defined these interactions? They could occur due to agricultural, trade, and labor relationships;
location, the fact that natural barriers between the main colonial city and the Pueblos were not large; or
because the colonial urban sprawl started to reach the territories of Pueblos de Indios (Tanck de Estrada
et al., 2005). However, in some cases Pueblos remained Indigenous-Only even if they were part of the
urban sprawl due to specific geographic characteristics, as Loreto-López (2013) shows for the case of
Puebla. It is important to highlight that the Pueblos closer to the colonial cities likely had more frequent
interactions with other castes or ethnic groups (Anderson, 1988)

8

Pueblos structure persisted throughout most of the colonial period; some of them disappeared by the
late colonial period (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2021). This institution persisted until the end of colonial times
because it permitted taxing isolated settlements. By the late XVIII century, authorities in New Spain
made substantial administrative reforms in order to centralize power and improve tax administration –also
known as Bourbon Reforms. Tanck de Estrada (2018) argues that as part of these reforms, authorities
documented more precisely the existence and location of Pueblos de Indios. Pueblos seggregation policy
teminate with Mexico’s independence from Spain, the legal institution ended de facto in 1821.
7
The historical literature suggests that most of the institutional patterns of the Pueblos were highly influenced by
colonial policies that successfully copied or recycled former Indigenous institutions, such as the calpulli, to encourage local
governance and maintain political stability.
8
Spaniards implemented a social stratification policy. They designated themselves as gente de razón as they considered themselves the only ones to make rational decisions. In contrast, they considered the Indigenous population as inferior, and they were called the “republic of Indians.” This social system is often referred as a “dual republic” (Vinson III,
2017)
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3

Data

3.1

Historical data

The main data in our analysis is the spatial location of the Pueblos de Indios. In the late 18th century
the Spanish crown executed extensive administrative changes to Pueblos de Indios with the objective
of improving local governance (Tanck de Estrada, 2018). The administrative reform produced written
records collected by Tanck de Estrada et al. (2005). The authors document the existence of 4,468 Pueblos
towards the end of the colonial period. Due to this effort, it is possible to determine the location of the
Pueblos de Indios and whether a Pueblo had an Indigenous-Only population or whether it had inhabitants
of multiple ancestries (Indigenous, African, and Spanish).9 Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution of
Pueblos across Mexico. A clear pattern appears; most Pueblos were located in central and south Mexico,
with others in the west and a few in the northwest.
Figure 2: Pueblos de Indios’ location

Notes: The map shows the borders of municipalities (light black), the delimitations of Mexican states (dark black), the
Mexican MSA’s (purple), and the Pueblos de Indios (red dots and yellow triangles)

Figure 2 also shows in purple the Mexican Metropolitan Statistical Areas defined by the Mexican govern9

The dataset also contains information on the Pueblos de Indios’s names, coordinates, modern town, modern municipality, modern state, the catholic saint that the Pueblos de Indios’ dwellers worshipped, and classification for whether the
Pueblos only had an Indigenous population in 1770 or not.
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ment. Since we are interested in the effects of Pueblos within city structure, we only analyze the MSA’s
that have at least one Pueblo de Indios (the purple regions where a yellow or a redpoint overlap). We
provide preliminary evidence that the Pueblos have effects in the urban context. In Table A.1 we use
López-Calva et al. (2022) data on income, poverty, and inequality at the municipal level to show that
urban municipalities with at least one Pueblo have higher poverty and lower income per capita. Thus,
the colonial institution has adverse effects in the urban context.

3.2

Contemporary data

For contemporary outcomes, we rely mainly on Mexico’s Census for 2020. We construct a georeferenced
dataset for the universe of urban blocks for those MSA’s that have at least one Pueblo. The sample
includes approximately half a million observations. Urban blocks consist of closed groups of housing
units divided by streets and avenues. The median block area is 4,691 square meters, while the average
block area is 11,824. In terms of inhabitants, the median (mean) number of housing units is 21 (30), with
a median (mean) population of 64 (91) people per block. Table 1 shows further descriptive statistics.
Table 1: 2020 Census Blocks: Summary statistics

(m2 )

Area
Perimeter (m)
Population
Female share
Indigenous share
Afro-origin share
Born in other state share
Living in other state at 2015 share
Housing units
Inhabited housing units share
Years of schooling
People per room
Dist. to CBD
Dist. to cathedral
Dist. to nearest Pueblo
Dist. to admin. boundary
Dist. to admin. boundary (LOO)

Minimum

Percentile 25

Median

Mean

Percentile 75

Maximum

6.08
0.01
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00

2556.48
0.23
32.00
0.49
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.00
12.00
0.79
9.14
0.73
4.19
4.22
8.19
5.49
4.12

4691.50
0.32
64.00
0.52
0.00
0.00
0.16
0.00
21.00
0.88
10.42
0.91
7.59
7.93
16.99
10.85
7.65

11824.61
0.45
91.39
0.52
0.04
0.02
0.21
0.03
30.30
0.85
10.70
0.95
11.00
11.33
21.22
13.20
9.82

8728.65
0.46
112.00
0.55
0.03
0.00
0.28
0.04
36.00
0.95
12.15
1.11
14.82
15.31
29.93
20.45
15.32

6799133.63
33.87
10484.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
3284.00
1.00
19.60
12.00
103.49
106.78
120.89
38.67
37.55

Notes: Based on 2020 Mexican Census.

Mexico’s Census also records variables on socio-economic outcomes, such as average years of schooling
and the average number of individuals per room (a proxy for housing overcrowding). Additionally, we
obtain data at the block level related to amenities in each block, precisely altitude, nighttime lights,
pollution, the maximum and minimum temperature recorded in a year, average yearly precipitation,
distance to water bodies, distance to city limits, distance to the central business district10 , and estimates
10

The central business district is measured as the mean point in latitude and longitude of all finance, insurance, real
estate, and banking establishments reported by the National Statistical Directory of Economic Units (DENUE), a census
of all establishments in Mexico created by INEGI.

10
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Figure 3: Pueblos de Indios, blocks, and administrative units in the Metropolitan Statistical Area of
Mexico City

Notes: The purple contour line encompasses all municipalities that are part of Mexico City Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA), and the line represents the MSA’s administrative boundary. The light black contour lines delineate the boundaries
of the municipalities within Mexico City MSA. Blue polygons are all blocks that are part of the sprawl of Mexico City
MSA. Red dots represent Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos’ locations, while yellow triangles indicate the location of
Indigenous-Only Pueblos. The black triangle is the location of the central business district, measured as the mean point in
latitude and longitude of all finance, real estate, insurance and banking establishments in the MSA .

of the historical population.11
11

INEGI produces the geospatial data for altitude, latitude, and longitude. The geospatial data on weather come from
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Lastly, to analyze the persistence mechanisms, we use Encuesta de Movilidad Social (EMOVI) 2015
survey. We use such a dataset since Mexican Census only records whether an individual self-identifies as
Indigenous or Afro-Mexican, or none of both. Furthermore, Mexican Census does not track individuals
through census waves or location. EMOVI data measures intergenerational mobility from a representative
sample of individuals living in Mexico City with information on geographic location and skin tone. The
skin tone is recorded through the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA) color
palette.12 The palette accounts for the racial composition of the population in Latin America (CamposVazquez & Medina-Cortina, 2019). The PERLA palette classifies the skin tone into 11 categories, with
1 indicating the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest one.

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)’s Daily Surface Weather and Climatological Summaries
(Daymet) project. Maps on nighttime lights are from 2018 and come from the National Centers for Environmental Information. Our geospatial data on pollution is for PM2.5 particles in 2018, and the Atmospheric Composition Analysis Group created the shapefiles at the Washington University in St Louis. Spatial data on water bodies come from the
Biogeo Lab at the University of California, Davis (Hijmans, 2021). Estimates of the historical population come from the
HYDE project by Klein Goldewijk & Stehfest (2017). Spatial data from of colonial buildings comes from Stangl (2019)
12
See https://perla.soc.ucsb.edu/. EMOVI ask respondents to self-report their skin tone choosing from the PERLA
palette. Telles (2014) describes more details on the PERLA palette. We include an image of the PERLA palette in Figure
G.1 at Appendix G
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4

Empirical framework

We analyze the long-term impacts of colonial segregation on within-city sorting patterns for Mexican
MSAs. As explained in the historical context, Section 2, segregation was successful for those Pueblos
that only had an Indigenous population by the end of the colonial period. Then, we study how colonial
segregation persists by creating agglomerations of poverty in urban blocks nearby segregated Pueblos.

4.1

Estimation strategy

Our unit of analysis is the urban block within MSAs. We use the universe of urban blocks within MSAs
which at least have one Pueblo.13 We define the treatment by the spatial proximity to places where
colonial segregation was successful. Our treatment distinguishes the impacts of being close to Pueblos
that only had Indigenous inhabitants by the end of the Spanish colonial period –Indigenous-Only Pueblo–,
vis a vis being close to those Pueblos with a heterogeneous-ancestry population –Heterogeneous-Ancestry
Pueblo–.14 Given the multiplicity of Pueblos within MSAs and the lack of clear borders delimiting
their influence, we assigned treatment by matching every block to the nearest Pueblo based on geodesic
distance. If the nearest Pueblo is an Indigenous-Only Pueblo, then the block is treated. If the block is
closest to an Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblo, the block is part of the control group.
We consider the following specification to answer our research question:
Yb = β1 1[Indigenous − Only P I]b + Wb′ Γ + θmun + ϵb

(1)

where Yb is the outcome variable of interest in block b (e.g., a measure of housing overcrowding or
average years of schooling). Treatment is represented by 1[Indigenous − Only P I]b : an indicator equal
to 1 if the type of Pueblo closest to the block b is an Indigenous-Only Pueblo and equal to 0 if the
type of Pueblo is an Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblo. Lastly, Wb′ is a vector of covariates for every block
including agglomeration controls –(log) distance to the nearest Pueblo de Indios, (log) distance to the
MSA’s central business district, (log) population density, and (log) distance to the MSA’s city limits–,15
and geographical controls –altitude, temperature, precipitation, pollution–.
Since our hypothesis is that colonial segregation shapes contemporary sorting patterns, the latter means
that colonial segregation does not have a direct effect on individuals’ socio-economic outcomes. That is
13

We exclude regions outside MSAs from the analysis, which are mostly rural, given their economic outcomes today
are likely related to the rise in competition between commercial and peasant agriculture sectors that emerged during the
late colonial period (Van Young, 1984). Moreover, there exists evidence that Pueblos de Indios had a different role in rural
areas (Arteaga, 2018), where Indigenous institutions are very important for local towns (Elizalde, 2020).
14
Tanck de Estrada (2005) documents that ethnically diverse Pueblos had a population that included individuals of
African, Indigenous, and Spanish ancestries. Nevertheless, it is sensible to assume that the largest population group by
the end of the colonial times were individuals with both Spanish and Indigenous ancestry, denominated as mestizo in the
past and today. The previous assumption is due to a large number of interracial marriages between individuals of Spanish
and Indigenous ancestry during colonial times.
15
MSA’s city limits are proxied by distance to the MSA’s convex hull: the smallest convex set that contains all urban
blocks within a MSA. Thus it differs from MSA’s administrative limits because the latter includes territory without population.
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colonial segregation does not directly increase contemporary individuals’ educational achievement. Colonial segregation, however, shapes within-city structure by creating agglomeration patterns of individuals
with specific socio-economic outcomes –which might indirectly affect individuals’ outcomes through dynamic effects—. We want to study whether people with specific characteristics select to locate nearby
Indigenous-Only Pueblos. The latter means that β1 , our parameter of interest, measures sorting. We
expect a negative sign for outcomes representing higher socio-economic well-being (i.e., years of schooling), and a positive sign for outcomes that are a proxy for lower socio-economic well-being (i.e. housing
overcrowding).
To consider differences between MSAs, for instance, population size or sprawl, we would include MSA
fixed effects. Nonetheless, MSAs encompass multiple municipalities, where there could be substantial
within-MSA heterogeneity given differences in public goods provision.16 To account for those differences
and exploit only within-municipality variation, we include municipality fixed effects in our specification,
θmun .
Naturally, we expect spatial autocorrelation between neighboring blocks. It is unclear, however, the
spatial extent of such autocorrelation. We rely on two types of standard errors for inference. First, we
estimate Conley standard errors using a 5-kilometer ratio (Conley, 1999). Second, we compute clustered
standard errors at the geostatistical basic area level, AGEB. Intuitively, an AGEB represents a statistical
area comprising several city blocks with similar characteristics, same land use, and specific boundaries
chosen by the government agency that collects the Census data.17 AGEB’s mean (median) area is 0.325
(0.231) square kilometers. We consider Conley 5-kilometer standard errors very conservative since they
include several AGEB’s, thus including groups of blocks that might be dissimilar.18 Furthermore, existing
literature argues that AGEBs reflect better the spatial configuration of modern settlements relative to
other spatial partitions (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2021). Thus, they are more likely to be a better cluster for
standard errors since blocks within AGEBs are more similar in modern times. However, in the interest
of transparency, we estimate two types of standard errors for all our regressions.

4.2

Identification strategy

We exploit different research designs and exogenous variation to identify the causal effect of colonial
segregation policies on contemporary sorting patterns. First, we show that Indigenous-Only Pueblos’
and Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos’ locational fundamentals do not differ within MSAs. Second, we use
Spatial First Differences (SFD) research design to purge unobserved spatial heterogeneity Druckenmiller
& Hsiang (2019) . Lastly, we introduce a new instrumental variable and use a two-stage least squares
16

In Mexico, the municipality authorities are in charge of the provision of public goods such as police force, property
taxes, waste management, pavement, street lights, etcetera.
17
To some extent, AGEB is similar to US Census Tract. Although, the methodology to define it is different. According
to Mexico’s official statistical institute (INEGI), AGEB’s exact definition is “Geographical statistical area that comprises
less than 50 blocks. The area must have clear geographical boundaries such as streets, avenues, tracks, or a clear terrain
delimitation. The area must have the same land use, housing, commercial, industrial, services, etcetera.”(INEGI, 2010).
18
In Appendix D, Figure D.1 shows a map that illustrates how a 5-kilometer ratio can comprise several AGEBs.
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method to uncover the causal effect of interest.
In terms of sources of statistical endogeneity, reverse causality is not an issue. Given the historical context,
contemporary sorting patterns do not influence Pueblos’ location. Furthermore, we believe measurement
error might not represent a significant concern, as we discuss in section 2. Since we are interested in the
success of the segregation policy by the end of the colonial period and given historical evidence presented
in Section 3, we believe there is no miscounting of Pueblos.
Our specification in Equation 1, suffers from endogeneity due to three different sources of unobserved heterogeneity. The first source of unobserved heterogeneity is the non-randomness of treatment assignment:
in our setting, Pueblos location. That is, the time-invariant geographical amenities that made it more
likely that a Pueblo was isolated from interaction with the Spanish, thus becoming an Indigenous-Only
Pueblo, are not the same as those of Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos.
Another source of omitted variable bias is the unobserved historical spatial heterogeneity. Specifically,
we cannot account for unobservable historical characteristics generated by different types of Pueblos. As
an example, historical amenities correlated with the type of Pueblos could shape agglomeration in the
past –proximity to churches or public markets– and also impact the current economic outcomes of city
blocks.
Finally, the third source of endogeneity is contemporary unobserved heterogeneity. Even if accounting
for observables that serve as proxies for agglomerations or economic activity, we cannot account for contemporary amenities at a highly granular level (i.e., housing prices, likelihood of bad soil for earthquakes,
among others).
The following subsections explain how we deal with such sources of endogeneity.
4.2.1

Balance on locational fundamentals

Locational fundamentals are vital for the understanding of economic activity and location selection
(Davis & Weinstein, 2002). We show that there are no systematic differences in locational fundamentals
between Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos and Indigenous-Only Pueblo once accounting for MSA fixedeffects. To do so, we select Pueblos within MSA’s. There are 300 Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos and
638 Indigenous-Only Pueblo in our sample. We construct a 1-kilometer buffer around each Pueblo de
Indios type and obtain mean values of different locational fundamentals: altitude, slope, distance to the
coastline, maize suitability, among others. We compute t-tests to compare the means of these variables.
The results are presented in Table 2
Table 2 shows that the two type of Pueblos differ significantly in locational fundamentals. IndigenousOnly Pueblos are located at places with higher altitude and higher slope. They also are located in colder
places, with higher maize suitability, and further away from the coast. Moreover, the two types of Pueblos
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Table 2: Balance tests for all Pueblos de Indios located within MSA’s
Pueblo de Indios (mean value of variables)

Without MSA FE

With MSA FE

Heterogeneous-Ancestry
(1)

Indigenous-Only
(2)

Difference
(3)

p-value
(4)

Difference
(5)

p-value
(6)

1498.6246
0.0495
19.4985
-97.3919
28.3271
13.2005
813.7596
813.1951
9383.4498
7009.7883
2899.0385
2533.2060

2093.9328
0.0646
19.6350
-99.5983
26.3242
9.7201
513.3468
585.8371
10445.4449
7182.4917
3125.7049
2664.0612

595.3081
0.0151
0.1365
-2.2064
-2.0029
-3.4805
-300.4128
-227.3579
1061.9952
172.7034
226.6663
130.8552

0.0000
0.0002
0.1640
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.3029
0.0000
0.0027

-8.0500
0.0094
0.0099
0.0575
-0.0078
0.0436
-1.2989
2.4799
78.7064
-70.1269
65.4635
-20.7492

0.8388
0.0574
0.7744
0.0025
0.9610
0.8446
0.8293
0.2471
0.6326
0.5058
0.0240
0.2045

355.2918
213.3880
625.0972
1032.3916
964.1570

405.9347
185.7670
484.8804
775.6045
757.8367

50.6429
-27.6210
-140.2168
-256.7871
-206.3203

0.1602
0.0559
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

-220.1342
-167.4064
4.2203
-69.6591
-30.3490

0.2354
0.1458
0.8753
0.2402
0.2996

17.5065
780.2561

21.1998
641.0573

3.6933
-139.1988

0.0000
0.0002

-0.2080
22.4401

0.0651
0.3441

300

683

Locational fundamentals
Altitude
Slope
Latitude
Longitude
Temperature Max.
Temperature Min.
Precipitation
Distance to nearest coastline
Maize High-intensity Irrigation
Maize High-intensity Rain
Maize Low-intensity Irrigation
Maize Low-intensity Rain
Pre-colonial and colonial agglomerations
Population by 1400
Population by 1800
Dist. to colonial city
Dist. to colonial mine
Dist. to colonial hacienda
Contemporary outcomes
Pollution PM25
Distance to CBD
Number of Pueblos

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 present the mean value of each variable for 1 kilometer buffers around each Pueblo. MSA FE stands for Metropolitan
Statistical Area fixed effects. The p-values after Metropolitan Statistical Area fixed effects is clustered at the MSA level.

also differ in pre-colonial and colonial agglomerations. Indigenous-Only Pueblos had a lower population
by the end of the colonial period. Consistent with the historical context, Indigenous-Only Pueblos were
farther away from colonial cities, mines, and haciendas.
Nonetheless, the previous unbalance on observables can be due to differences between broad locational
fundamentals of MSAs. For instance, given Mexico City’s altitude is higher than Guadalajara’s. Then
differences in locational fundamentals between the two types of Pueblos can be less salient once accounting
for broad geographic differences between MSAs. We perform a second set of balance tests by adding MSA
fixed effects (columns 5 and 6). Wihtin MSA’s, only two locational fundamentals differ between the two
types of Pueblos: slope and low-intensity irrigation maize suitability.
While there is balance in most observable locational fundamentals, we still control for geographic controls in some of our specifications to test our results’ robustness. Moreover, recall our specification in
Equation 1 also includes municipal fixed effects, which purges further within-MSA variation on locational
fundamentals.
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4.2.2

Spatial First Differences

Unobserved spatial heterogeneity might still bias our results. The latter because we observe historical and
contemporary data but have few ways to control for other unobserved historical factors that correlate with
Pueblos and modern outcomes. Unobserved spatial heterogeneity is common and essential to consider
in highly granular settings, such as urban economics or environmental economics studies, but also in
historical settings (Valencia Caicedo, 2021). Standard cross-sectional approaches cannot deal with such
bias in the absence of a sharp discontinuity or an instrumental variable.
We address the bias generated by unobserved spatial heterogeneity by implementing a spatial firstdifferences (SFD) design proposed by Druckenmiller & Hsiang (2019). SFD eliminates spatially correlated
unobserved heterogeneity that is constant across space. The identification assumption in SFD is that of
Local Conditional Independence. The latter is weaker than the Conditional Independence Assumption,
which assumes all observational units in a cross-section of data are comparable. Instead, Local Conditional
Independence assumes that “the expected potential outcome for two immediate neighbors is equal if
they would receive the same treatment.” Intuitively, the latter means that units closer in space share
unobserved heterogeneity and, thus, are better counterfactuals.19 If the Local Conditional Independence
Assumption holds, SFD allows us to identify causal effects.
In terms of implementation, SFD is similar to first-differences in time series to eliminate unobservables
constant across time. SFD substitutes the time index in panel settings with an index for locations in
space. Then it differentiates both the dependent and independent variables. For our specification, the
latter means we difference outcome and treatment between block b and its adjacent block b − 1. To define
the adjacency of blocks for each MSA, we order our observations first by latitude and then by longitude.
Then we differentiate our variables in the West-East direction.
Thus, Equation 1 turns into the following:
′
Yb − Yb−1 = β1 (1[Indigenous − Only P I]b − 1[Indigenous − Only P I]b−1 ) + (Wb′ − Wb−1
)Γ + (ϵb − ϵb−1 )

∆Yb = β1 ∆1[Indigenous − Only P I]b + ∆Wb′ Γ + ∆ϵb

(2)

Note that Equation 1 estimates on level, while Equation 2 estimates on differences. In Equation 2,
β1 identifies the change in the outcome of interest when block b treatment is not the same as that of
block b − 1. In this sense, most the variation in treatment will come from neighboring blocks that
do not share treatment status.20 As consequence, first we purge unobserved factors between adjacent
19

Druckenmiller & Hsiang (2019) argue that Local Conditional Independence Assumption might hold since it is at least
as valid as corresponding assumptions in other widely accepted identification strategies –for instance, Diff-in-Diff or Regression Discontinuity–. See Figure E.1 for a graphic illustration of Local Conditional Independence Assumption.
20
To fix ideas, imagine a straight line of four blocks where the first two are treated and the second two are part of the
control.
{Db1 = 1, Db2 = 1, Db3 = 0, Db4 = 0}
We implement a first difference approach between adjacent blocks, going from left to right.
⇒ {∆Db1 = N A, ∆Db2 = 0, ∆Db3 = −1, ∆Db4 = 0}
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blocks. Afterward, we test whether having as neighbor a treated urban block –matched to a IndigenousOnly Pueblo– or a control urban block –matched to a Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblo– correlate with
the (differenced) outcome. Therefore, SFD allows us to eliminate omitted variable bias from amenities
in Mexican cities that impact neighboring urban blocks or unobserved historical factors (i.e., colonial
temples or colonial markets).
4.2.3

Instrumental Variable

While SFD purges spatial heterogeneity common to neighboring blocks, plausibly, there are remaining
sources of unobserved heterogeneity that could bias our estimates. As an alternative way to address
omitted variable bias, we use an instrumental variable approach. In the spirit of Campante & Do (2014),
we exploit a source of contemporary exogenous variation: the distance of each block to the MSA administrative limits.
As discussed in the historical context, Indigenous-Only Pueblo settlements tended to be located far from
the colonial cities in order to fulfill their segregation purpose, thus having fewer economic and social
contacts with the Spaniards and other castes (Castro-Gutierrez, 2013b; Nemser, 2017). We exploit the
historical spatial pattern and use as an instrumental variable the distance of each urban block to the
MSA’s administrative borders –not the same as the boundaries of a municipality nor the distance to the
city limits. We then use a two-stage least squares procedure to estimate the causal effect of colonial
segregation on contemporary sorting patterns.
Figure 4 illustrates our proposed instrument. It shows the urban blocks within Mexico City MSA. To
illustrate our instrument, we select a random sample of blocks and plot in thin black lines the distance
between the block’s centroid to the nearest point in the MSA administrative limits. Note that the lines
do not represent the distance to the city limits. Indigenous-Only Pueblos are more likely to be closer to
MSA’s administrative borders compared to Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos. Such spatial arrangement
implies that urban blocks near the MSA’s administrative boundaries are more likely to be matched with
an Indigenous-Only Pueblo. Instead, urban blocks farther away from the MSA’s administrative limits are
more likely to be matched with a Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblo. Figure 4 illustrate the latter is true.
Historical evidence further supports our instrument’s relevance assumption. Most of the Criollos (or
Creoles) and the Peninsulares (Spanish born on the Iberic Peninsula) used to live in the colonial city
centers or neighboring areas. In these locations, there was an explicit policy that aimed to exclude
the native population and individuals with Indigenous ancestry (Castro-Gutierrez, 2013b; Alvarez-IcazaSince blocks 1 and 2 share treatment status, as well as blocks 3 and 4, the difference in treatment status equals zero,
∆Db = 0. Blocks 2 and 3, however, change treatment status: block 2 is treated and block 3 is in the control group. Thus,
the difference in treatment status is minus one.
The same logic can be used doing the first differences from right to left:
⇒ {∆Db1 = 0, ∆Db2 = 1, ∆Db3 = 0, ∆Db4 = N A}
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Longoria, 2013). Nevertheless, the colonial cities interacted with the closest Pueblos de Indios or the
ones with which they had commercial linkages. Hence, it was more likely that the Pueblos de Indios close
to the colonial city center had more multiracial marriages. Such phenomenon led to a higher number of
inhabitants with two or more ancestries (e.g., Mestizos who had both Spanish and Indigenous ancestries).
Interestingly, some Pueblos close to colonial cities had an Indigenous-Only population towards the end
of colonial times, although this was not a definitive rule.21
Figure 4: Spatial description of instrumental variable. Example: Mexico City MSA

Notes: The image on the left shows a spatial description of the instrumental variable for the entire Mexico City MSA.
The image on the right shows the same description in a zoomed area of the west part of Mexico City MSA. The black
lines represent a block’s distance to the administrative boundary formed by municipalities of the Mexico City MSA. We
did not use all blocks to illustrate the measure, but the same distance is computed for each block. Yellow triangles
represent Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos’ locations, while red dots indicate the location of Indigenous-Only Pueblos.

We formally test the relevance condition. We use a linear probability model for our first stage:
1[Indigenous − OnlyP ueblo]b = δ(Distance admin border)b + Zb′ Φ + θmun + ub

(3)

where 1(Indigenous − Only P ueblo)b is an indicator equal to 1 if the type of Pueblo assigned to block b
an Indigenous-Only Pueblos, or 0 if the urban block b is matched with a Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblo
where the colonial segregation policy failed. (Distance admin border)b is the distance of block b to
the closest MSA administrative border –the border that encompasses all the municipalities within the
metropolitan statistical area. θmun represents the municipality fixed effects. Zb is a vector of geographical
controls, which we include based on the urban economics literature. These controls include (log) distance
of every block to the central business district, (log) distance of a block to a proxy for city boundaries
21
The city of Puebla is interesting since many (but not all) Pueblos de Indios in the western part of the city only had
a native population, even though the Pueblos de Indios were very close to the colonial city center, as Loreto-López (2013)
documents with historical maps and colonial administrative records (see map in Appendix B).
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Figure 5: Linear probability model: Indigenous-Only Pueblo and distance to MSA administrative
boundaries

Notes: Results of linear probability model: Indigenous-Only Pueblo dummy (left-hand side) and the distance of each
block to their respective MSA administrative boundary (right-hand side). For illustration purposes, we divide the data in
bins and report the mean value of each bin.

–distance to the MSA blocks’ convex-hull–, (log) population density in the block, and (log) distance to
the closest Pueblo.
Figure 5 shows the linear probability model. We bin blocks’ distance to the administrative boundary and
plot the mean share of blocks matched to an Indigenous-Only Pueblo. Consistent with Figure 4 and the
historical evidence, blocks closer to the MSA’s administrative boundary are more likely to be matched
to an Indigenous-Only Pueblo. Blocks farther away from the MSA’ administrative limits are more likely
to be paired with an Heterogenous-Ancestry Pueblo.
Our argument is that since the administrative boundary’s shape of an MSA is unrelated to economic or
agglomeration factors, the distance of each block to the boundary is an exogenous source of variation. The
exogeneity assumption of our instrument relies on two considerations. First, including a municipality into
an MSA depends on commuting patterns and not due to administrative reasons. Commuting patterns
are the primary consideration when Mexico’s statistical agency, INEGI, includes new municipalities into
MSAs, next to distance to the central business district and patterns of the spatial distribution of the
population in each census (SEDATU, 2015). Other factors such as the shape, area, or boundaries of
a municipality are not relevant.22 Moreover, municipal borders have changed little, given the inclusion
of a municipality into an MSA. 95.7 percent of the current municipalities already existed in 1960.23
22

The exact description of the process of Mexico’s official statistical agency leading to the inclusion of a new municipality in a MSA is the following “... the criteria is based on the distance to the central city and the functional integration by
workplace (commuters)” (SEDATU, 2015).
23
Most of the municipal boundaries in Mexico were defined by 1960. In the Census of 1960, the number of municipal-
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Therefore, MSA’s administrative boundaries change just by including or dropping municipalities. Second,
the administrative borders of municipalities are not informative to document the actual area and limits
of a MSA. Urban economics literature shows that administrative limits and commuting patterns are
uncorrelated to the area where the inhabitants of a city live, or the actual city limits for a sample of
metropolitan areas around the world (Ch et al., 2021).24
A potential threat to the exogeneity of our instrument is that a few municipalities in the MSA drive our
results. To guarantee that one or a few municipalities do not drive the exogeneity of our instrumental
variable we implement a leave-one-out robustness procedure. In each metropolitan statistical area, we
eliminate one municipality and estimate the distance of each city block to the “new artificial administrative boundary” created by the elimination of a municipality. We repeat this for each municipality in
every MSA. Our instrument is the average distance of all the “new artificial administrative boundaries”
derived from the actual administrative boundary of the MSA using our procedure.25 We use our ‘robust’
measure of distance to the MSA administrative boundary rather than the standard measure in all our
specifications.26
The exclusion restriction assumption holds for our instrument under certain circumstances. While we
show evidence that the relevance assumption holds, and there is strong evidence in favor of the exogeneity
assumption, we argue that our instrument is plausibly exogenous (Conley et al., 2012). There might be
concerns that distance to the MSA’s administrative limits affects sorting patterns through other variables
besides colonial segregation.
First, we are concerned that our instrument also picks some institutional persistence of Pueblos. We
argue, however, that such is not the case. De facto, the colonial institution of Pueblos ended after Mexico
gained independence in 1821. Arteaga (2018) suggests that the governing institutions of Pueblos de Indios
persisted, given that several of them became municipalities. Given the historical context, if anything, the
institutional persistence of Pueblos in urban areas reflects through modern municipal institutions. Thus,
by including municipal fixed-effects, we control for contemporary and past institutions.
Another potential violation of the exclusion restriction is market access. Being close to the MSA’s
ities was 2377. For the 2020 Census, this number is 2,485. Then, Mexico created 108 new municipalities in a span of six
decades.
24
Harari (2020) analyzes with details city limits for the case of India. She also documents that cities extend beyond
administrative boundaries. Different than Ch et al. (2021), she hypothesizes that commuting patterns could influence city
limits for the case of India, but the main limitation of the data in such paper is the lack of precise commuting patterns of
households, which does not allow the author to confirm her hypothesis. Moreover, Ch et al. (2021) argues that commuting
patterns leave aside input-output relationships that increase the areas of cities.
25
That is, for a MSA with N municipalities, we estimate N-1 distances for each block to the “new artificial administrative limits” (created by eliminating a single and different municipality each time). Then, we estimate the distance of each
block to the actual administrative boundary. Our instrument is composed of the average of N distances for each one of the
city blocks of all Mexican MSAs.
26
Another potential threat to our instrument is that it is colinear to the distance to the city limits, or distance to the
MSA’s convex hull. However, we show that even both variables correlate positively, distance to the city limits can only
explain a fraction of the variation in our instrument. See Table C.1 in Appendix C. The intuition is also illustrated by
Figure 4 and the maps in Appendix B. Thus, city limits are not equal to the MSA’s administrative boundaries.
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administrative boundaries might be correlated with isolation in economic activity, or the entire effect of
Indigenous-Only Pueblos could depend on the distance to the city center. We argue that when controlling
by distance to the central business district, as well as by distance to the nearest Pueblo, we control for
market access and amenities. When controlling for the latter, our instrument only picks the probability
of being matched into a Indigenous-Only Pueblo.
The third threat to our identification are effects caused by slums in the peripheries of Mexican cities.
Such concern originates from the fact that slums are prevalent in the peripheries of urban areas in Latin
America (Sabatini, 2006). Thus, our instrument could be weakly correlated with agglomerations in the
city’s periphery. To address this issue, we control for the distance of each block to the city limits, which
are different to the administrative boundaries.
Lastly, our instrument could be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity that affects our variables of
interest. In order to minimize such concerns, we propose to combine the SFD and IV research designs.
As explained earlier, SFD purged out spatial unobserved hetereogeneity. We first differentiate outcomes
and treatment between adjacent blocks, an then we implement a 2SLS procedure. Specifications under
such method are labelled SFD-2SLS. We believe such method would purged out any of the remaining
unobserved factors that might violate the exclusion restriction. In summary,the exclusion restriction
holds conditioning on observables and by purging unobservables. In our results, we include specifications
with and without such variables to show that the sign and relative magnitude of the instrument does not
change substantially.
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5

Results

5.1

Secondary agglomerations

First, we test to what extent Pueblos de Indios generate secondary agglomerations within Mexican MSA’s.
These agglomerations are different from the primary agglomeration around the central business district.
Figure 6 displays the spatial distribution of the population density for Mexico City Metropolitan Statistical Area. The black triangle represents the central business district (CBD). The red points represent
Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos, while the orange triangles Indigenous-Only Pueblos. While most of
the population concentrates around the CBD, secondary agglomerations appear nearby Pueblos. These
spatial correlations are consistent with the predictions of a multi-centric city model (Fujita & Ogawa,
1982).
To test the existence of secondary agglomeration patterns, we run Poisson regressions on population
density versus distance to the closest Pueblo. As the estimates of our elasticities show (row 1, Table 3), a
1 percent increase in the distance farther away from a Pueblo correlates with a decrease of 0.6 percent in
population density. Such estimate from our specification of choice accounts for distance to the primary
agglomeration. The success of colonial segregation does not generate heterogeneous effects, as column 5
shows.
Figure 7 documents the non-linearity of the secondary agglomerations. We divide the sample of all blocks
in vigintiles according to their distance to the nearest Pueblo. Then we estimate the same elasticities of
population density with respect to distance to Pueblos as in Table 3, for each vigintile. The elasticity
for the first vigintile immediately adjacent to Pueblos is negative, but is not statistically significant at
the 5 percent significance level. However, for urban blocks located within two to eight vigintiles closer
to Pueblos, the elasticities of population density with respect to distance to Pueblos are between 2 and
4 percent. For vigintiles nine to twenty, all elasticities but one are not statistically significant at the 5
percent significance level.
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Figure 6: Secondary agglomerations in Mexico City MSA

Notes: The color palette from purple to yellow represents the population density of Mexico City MSA. The white lines
are the boundaries of the municipalities that are part of Mexico City MSA. Red circles represent the Indigenous-Only
Pueblos. Yellow triangles represent the Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos. The black triangle represents the location of the
central business district in Mexico City MSA.

5.2
5.2.1

Long-term effects on sorting patterns
OLS and SFD estimates

In this subsection, we provide a summary of the results of the main empirical analysis at a city-block
level shown in equation 1. We provide estimates of the causal impact of Indigenous-Only Pueblos on
nearby blocks relative to those blocks matched to Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos. Our key outcomes
are housing overcrowding (measured as people per room) and education (years of schooling).
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Figure 7: Non-linearity of secondary agglomerations

Notes: We display the estimates of the elasticities of population density with respect to distance to nearest Pueblo for
different subsamples. To create these estimates we divide the sample of blocks in vigintiles according to their distance to
the nearest Pueblo, and we re-estimate spatial correlations for each subsample. The confidence intervals were constructed
at the 5 percent confidence level.

We report the results for different methods: OLS, SFD, 2SLS, and SFD-2SLS. We report four types of
specifications. Firstly, no controls. Secondly, our only control variable is distance of each block to nearest
Pueblo. Thirdly, we consider as controls distance to nearest Pueblo and other agglomeration variables.
Lastly, we include distance to nearest Pueblo, other agglomeration variables, and geographic controls.
The group of other agglomeration controls includes (log) distance to CBD, (log) population density, and
(log) distance to city limits. The group of geographic controls includes altitude, slope, minimum and
maximum temperatures, precipitation, and average PM 2.5 concentration levels. All our specifications
include block-type fixed effects to account for the different types of urban blocks according to Mexico’s
Census, a dummy if the block is urban,27 and municipal fixed effects to control for the institutional and
historical characteristics of the municipalities (Arteaga, 2018). Throughout the rest of the paper, our
preferred specifications are two: the one that accounts for all agglomeration controls, including distance
to nearest Pueblo, and the one that also accounts for the geographic controls.
We show the OLS and SFD estimates for years of schooling in Table 4. The OLS results indicate that if an
urban block is associated with an Indigenous-Only Pueblo, the years of schooling fall between 0.123 and
0.125 standard deviations (columns 3 and 4, Panel A). The SFD estimates suggest that these reductions
are between 0.165 and 0.173 standard deviations (columns 7 and 8, Panel B). All the previous estimates
are statistically significant at the five percent significance level when we consider either Conley standard
27

An MSA in Mexico can include rural blocks since the decision to include a new county (municipality) in a metropolitan statistical area depends on the urban commuters only. Nevertheless, such county can include rural blocks.
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Table 3: Secondary agglomerations of Pueblos de Indios

Population density (log)

Dist. to nearest Pueblo (log)

(1)
-0.059
(0.004)
[0.004]

(2)
-0.036
(0.003)
[0.003]

Dist. to CBD (log)

Poisson
(3)
-0.004
(0.003)
[0.003]

(4)
-0.006
(0.003)
[0.003]

(5)
-0.006
(0.003)
[0.003]

-0.157
(0.007)
[0.009]

-0.103
(0.007)
[0.010]

-0.104
(0.007)
[0.010]

1[Indigenous-Only Pueblo]

Mean Dep. Var.
No. Obs.
R2 Pseudo
MSA FE
Block-type controls
Geographic controls

0.008
(0.016)
[0.022]
215.25
620,542
0.175
X

215.25
620,523
0.477
X
X

215.25
620,523
0.485
X
X

215.25
620,523
0.495
X
X
X

215.25
620,523
0.495
X
X
X

Notes: Coefficients expressed in elasticities. Clustered standard errors by AGEB in parenthesis.
Conley standard errors in brackets. Mean dependent variable is people per squared kilometer.
Block-type controls include urban block dummy and type of block dummy. Geographic controls
include: altitude, slope, minimum temperature, maximum temperature, precipitation, and PM
2.5 concentration.

errors or clustered standard errors at the AGEB level. The previous estimates suggest that the impacts
are 0.3 to 0.35 years of schooling.
We display the results for housing overcrowding in Table 4. Our specifications of choice (columns 3
and 4, panel B) document that a block associated with an Indigenous-Only Pueblo, the number of people per room increases between 0.048 and 0.05 standard deviations relative to blocks associated with
a Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblo. When considering the spatial differences design, the impacts are between 0.075 and 0.10 standard deviations (columns 7 to 8, panel B). The SFD estimates are statistically
significant at the 1 percent significance level, using clustered standard errors at the AGEB level. These
estimates suggest the impacts are between 0.01 and 0.03 extra people per room.
We observe two patterns in all our OLS and SFD estimates. The first pattern is that the magnitude of the
estimates does not change substantially after adding geographical controls once we consider all variables
related to agglomerations. This finding suggests the relevance of market access in our empirical analyses.
It is why our preferred specifications are those regressions that include all agglomeration controls. Our
second pattern is that all SFD estimates are larger than our OLS estimates in absolute terms. Thus, we
conclude that unobserved spatially correlated heterogeneity generates downward bias.
As we did with secondary agglomerations, we provide a descriptive analysis of heterogeneous effects of
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Table 4: Long-term effects: OLS & SFD
Panel A

Years of schooling (z-score)
OLS

1[Indigenous-Only Pueblo]

SFD

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-0.209
(0.024)
[0.077]

-0.208
(0.024)
[0.077]

-0.125
(0.023)
[0.059]

-0.123
(0.022)
[0.055]

-0.305
(0.009)
[0.039]

-0.304
(0.009)
[0.039]

-0.165
(0.010)
[0.034]

-0.173
(0.010)
[0.032]

-0.081
(0.004)
[0.013]

-0.016
(0.003)
[0.008]

-0.018
(0.003)
[0.008]

-0.033
(0.002)
[0.005]

-0.004
(0.002)
[0.004]

-0.003
(0.002)
[0.005]

Dist. to nearest Pueblo (log)

Panel B

People per room (z-score)
OLS

1[Indigenous-Only Pueblo]

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.145
(0.021)
[0.063]

0.144
(0.021)
[0.062]

0.050
(0.019)
[0.043]

0.048
(0.018)
[0.039]

0.225
(0.008)
[0.037]

0.223
(0.008)
[0.036]

0.075
(0.008)
[0.026]

0.100
(0.008)
[0.023]

0.092
(0.005)
[0.015]

0.026
(0.003)
[0.007]

0.029
(0.004)
[0.008]

0.039
(0.002)
[0.006]

0.011
(0.002)
[0.004]

0.010
(0.002)
[0.004]

566,260
X
X

566,260
X
X
X

564,364
X
X
X
X

566,207
X
X

566,207
X
X
X

562,903
X
X
X
X

Dist. to nearest Pueblo (log)

Num.Obs.
Municipal FE
Block-type FE
Other agglomeration controls
Geographic controls

SFD

566,260
X
X

566,207
X
X

Notes: Mean (sd) years of schooling according to Mexico’s Census of 2020: 10.69 (2.176). Mean (sd) people per room according
to Mexico’s Census of 2020: 0.945 (0.306). Clustered standard errors by AGEB in parenthesis. Conley standard errors in brackets
(5km). SFD arranges blocks by longitude, then latitude, and subsequently uses the first-differences approach. Block-type controls
include an urban block dummy and a block-type dummy. Other agglomeration controls include: log distance to CBD, log distance
to block population density, log distance to city limits. Geographic controls include: altitude, slope, minimum temperature, maximum temperature, precipitation, average PM2.5 concentration.
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Figure 8: Pueblos de Indios and years of schooling

Notes: The polygons are colored according to a blue-to-yellow palette which represents the years of schooling. The purple
contour line represents the administrative boundary of Mexico City MSA. The thin black lines represent the boundaries of
the counties (municipalities) that are part of the MSA. The black triangle represents the central business district of
Mexico City MSA. Standard errors are clustered at the AGEB level.

the treatment by distance to nearest Pueblo. We split our sample by distance bins (vigintiles) to the
nearest Pueblo. Figures F.1 and F.2 in Appendix F we document the presence of these non-linear effects.
The figures show that those blocks closer to the Pueblos (vigintiles 2 to 7) have statistically significant
impacts at the 5 percent level. The effects vanish as the distance to the nearest Pueblo increases. This
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heterogeneity is consistent with the secondary agglomeration results.
We generate a second descriptive analysis to document a second source of heterogeneity. We explore how
the impacts of formerly segregated Pueblos on nearby blocks differ in magnitude by MSA. As figures
F.3 and F.4 in Appendix F illustrate, such heterogeneity is present for both of our outcomes, education
and housing overcrowding, across different metropolitan statistical areas. The previous findings might
suggest the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects when we use instrumental variables estimation.
Interestingly, we document the presence of heterogeneity due to impacts that depend on the distance of
blocks to Pueblos and the metropolitan statistical area. The previous findings suggest that the Average
Treatment Effects obtained in our OLS and SFD estimates using our entire sample are quite heterogeneous
impacts, which could influence our results. Nevertheless, as different estimates in the Results section show,
under different methods, specifications, and types of standard errors, the heterogeneity of the effects only
affects the magnitudes of our impacts. All estimates indicate the presence of persistent effects of the
colonial segregation policy on modern economic outcomes.
5.2.2

2SLS and SFD-2SLS estimates

We display our 2SLS estimates in Table 5 for the main outcomes. In our preferred specifications (columns
3 and 4, panel A), the 2SLS estimates demonstrate that the impact of formerly segregated pueblos on
years of schooling is between minus 2.897 and minus 2.85 standard deviations on nearby blocks relative
to those urban blocks matched to Pueblos where colonial segregation failed. The impact of formerly
segregated Pueblos on housing overcrowding is between 2.262 and 2.303 standard deviations (columns
3 and 4, panel B) for our preferred specifications. These estimates are statistically significant at the 1
percent significance level for either Conley standard errors or clustered standard errors at the AGEB
level. The 2SLS estimates are substantially larger in absolute levels relative to any OLS estimates in
Table 5. Thus, unobserved heterogeneity generates downward bias for our main outcomes of interest.
Interestingly, for all our specifications the value of our F-statistic is above 2,500. This result indicates we
are not in the presence of a weak instrumental variable (Bound et al., 1995) since our F-statistic is above
all the thresholds suggested by the applied econometrics literature (Lee et al., 2020; Olea & Pflueger,
2013; Stock & Yogo, 2005).
The SFD-2SLS estimates are in Table 5. We find that Indigenous-Only Pueblos lead to lower education
levels and more housing overcrowding in nearby urban blocks (columns 7 and 8, both panels). Specifically, individuals living in a block matched to a Indigenous-Only Pueblo have fewer years of education,
by 0.897 to 1.482 standard deviations, compared to people living in urban blocks near HeterogeneousAncestry Pueblos. Furthermore, the blocks near formerly segregated Pueblos have between 0.549 and
1.417 standard deviations more people per room relative to blocks associated with Pueblos with failed
segregation. The previous estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level, using
either type of standard errors.
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These effects are sizable. We construct an interval for the impacts using the lowest and the highest
estimates of 2SLS and SFD-2SLS for our preferred specifications. The estimates imply the impacts are
between minus 6.2 and minus 1.95 years of schooling. Given that the mean educational achievement level
in the country is 10.69 years of education, the upper bound estimate for education implies that people
living in the treated blocks do not complete primary education and the lower bound estimate suggests
they drop from secondary school. For housing overcrowding, the estimates imply between 0.16 and 0.69
more individuals per room.28 These impacts are considerable since Mexico’s average number of people
per room in Mexico is 0.945. Then our relative impacts are between 17 and 73 percent of the national
average.
Our SFD-2SLS estimates are larger in absolute levels than any of our OLS estimates. This comparison
confirms that unobserved heterogeneity creates downward bias in the OLS estimates. We also notice that
the SFD-2SLS estimates are lower in absolute terms relative to the 2SLS estimates. Nevertheless, the sign
remains unaltered. Moreover, in both cases, the estimates suggest substantial impacts on both education
and housing overcrowding. We attribute the differences in magnitudes to the presence of heterogeneous
effects, which we document in the previous subsection.
We are likely to have heterogeneous treatment effects given the differentiated impacts by distance to
nearest Pueblo and by MSA. As Cunningham (2021) shows, intuitively, we are identifying impacts only
for those blocks that changed in response to the treatment, that is, the presence of formerly segregated
Pueblos. In other words, the interpretation of our 2SLS and SFD-2SLS estimates exclusively applies to
blocks that are susceptible to the historical treatment.

5.3

Robustness

We implement five different robustness. We consider regressions with population weights to guarantee
that the more dense urban blocks do not lose importance in our empirical analysis. Also, we use samples
with Mexico City only and without Mexico City to show that our results are not driven exclusively by the
most populated city in the country. Additionally, we consider a sample of those metropolitan statistical
areas that have both types of Pueblos to ensure that cities with specific historical characteristics that
influence the presence of one type of Pueblo do not determine our results. Lastly, we consider a sample
that only includes urban blocks located within 5 kilometers of Pueblos de Indios. We implement the
last robustness check to make sure our results are not sensitive to the presence of blocks far away from
any Pueblo given the non-linearities discussed in the previous subsection. We use a specification that
considers the full set of controls in all our robustness checks. The results of all our robustness checks are
in Table 6.
The estimates across most of the different robustness checks (first row of both panels, Table 6) suggest
that our results do not change substantially. There are two exceptions, the 2SLS estimates for the sample
28

In Mexico, each level of education is defined in the following way: six years for primary education, three years for
secondary education, three years for tertiary education, and four to five years for college.
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Table 5: Long-term effects: 2SLS & SFD-2SLS
Panel A

Years of schooling (z-score)
2SLS

1[Indigenous-Only Pueblo]

SFD-2SLS

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-2.778
(0.410)
[1.205]

-2.658
(0.399)
[1.169]

-2.897
(0.350)
[1.067]

-2.850
(0.376)
[1.073]

-2.202
(0.181)
[0.791]

-2.161
(0.181)
[0.790]

-0.897
(0.091)
[0.350]

-1.482
(0.154)
[0.584]

-0.079
(0.005)
[0.013]

-0.030
(0.004)
[0.011]

-0.032
(0.004)
[0.012]

-0.021
(0.002)
[0.006]

-0.005
(0.002)
[0.004]

-0.004
(0.002)
[0.004]

Dist. to nearest Pueblo (log)

Panel B

People per room (z-score)
2SLS

1[Indigenous-Only Pueblo]

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

1.400
(0.335)
[0.922]

1.262
(0.326)
[0.895]

2.262
(0.299)
[0.836]

2.303
(0.326)
[0.886]

1.257
(0.149)
[0.600]

1.193
(0.149)
[0.599]

0.549
(0.080)
[0.259]

1.417
(0.141)
[0.542]

0.092
(0.005)
[0.015]

0.037
(0.004)
[0.010]

0.040
(0.005)
[0.011]

0.032
(0.002)
[0.006]

0.011
(0.002)
[0.003]

0.011
(0.002)
[0.004]

566,260
3,889.9
X
X

566,260
4,878.3
X
X
X

564,364
4,109.1
X
X
X
X

566,207
2,526.0
X
X

566,207
8,470.9
X
X
X

562903
3,487.6
X
X
X
X

Dist. to nearest Pueblo (log)

Num.Obs.
F-statistic
Municipal FE
Block-type controls
Other agglomeration controls
Geographic controls

SFD-2SLS

566,260
3,889.3
X
X

566,207
2,588.2
X
X

Notes: Mean (sd) years of schooling according to Mexico’s Census of 2020: 10.69 (2.176). Mean (sd) people per room according
to Mexico’s Census of 2020: 0.945 (0.306). Clustered standard errors by AGEB in parenthesis. Conley standard errors in brackets
(5km). SFD arranges blocks by longitude, then latitude, and subsequently uses the first-differences approach. Block-type controls
include an urban block dummy and a block-type dummy. Agglomeration controls include: log of distance to CBD, log of population density, log of distance to city limits. Geographic controls include: altitude, slope, minimum temperature, maximum temperature, precipitation, average PM2.5 concentration.
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Table 6: Long-term effects: Robustness
2SLS
(1)

(2)

(3)

SFD-2SLS
(4)

Panel A

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

Years of schooling (z-score)

1[Indigenous-Only Pueblo]

-2.412
(0.362)
[1.013]

-2.294
(1.490)
[2.539]

-2.721
(0.367)
[1.054]

-2.371
(0.313)
[0.926]

-1.012
(0.346)
[0.714]

-1.481
(0.167)
[0.532]

-0.719
(0.117)
[0.196]

-1.285
(0.136)
[0.512]

-0.857
(0.099)
[0.378]

-0.359
(0.195)
[0.594]

Dist. to nearest Pueblo (log)

-0.024
(0.005)
[0.011]

-0.004
(0.004)
[0.003]

-0.029
(0.005)
[0.013]

-0.023
(0.004)
[0.011]

0.013
(0.015)
[0.031]

-0.003
(0.003)
[0.004]

-0.006
(0.003)
[0.002]

0.001
(0.002)
[0.006]

-0.011
(0.002)
[0.003]

0.043
(0.008)
[0.021]

Panel B

People per room (z-score)

1[Indigenous-Only Pueblo]

1.797
(0.280)
[0.788]

1.929
(1.418)
[2.277]

2.195
(0.318)
[0.869]

1.799
(0.251)
[0.759]

1.224
(0.358)
[0.702]

1.420
(0.153)
[0.505]

0.659
(0.119)
[0.229]

1.195
(0.124)
[0.428]

0.545
(0.082)
[0.304]

0.947
(0.201)
[0.767]

Dist. to nearest Pueblo (log)

0.033
(0.004)
[0.010]

0.005
(0.004)
[0.003]

0.039
(0.005)
[0.012]

0.027
(0.003)
[0.009]

0.108
(0.012)
[0.029]

0.009
(0.002)
[0.004]

0.009
(0.003)
[0.003]

0.007
(0.002)
[0.004]

0.013
(0.002)
[0.003]

0.044
(0.008)
[0.024]

No. Obs.
F-statistic
Population weights
Only ZMVM
Without ZMVM
MTA with both Pueblo
Within 5km buffer
Municipal FE
Block-type controls
Other agglomeration controls
Geographic controls

564,364
3,235.9
X

153,168
120.3

411,196
4,569.8

351,559
4,625.7

76,806
1,673.0

562,903
3,248.8
X

153,167
1,449.1

409,736
6,053.2

351,540
5,285.6

76,740
1,756.4

X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Notes: Mean (sd) years of schooling according to Mexico’s Census of 2020: 10.69 (2.176). Mean (sd) people per room according to Mexico’s Census of
2020: 0.945 (0.306). Clustered standard errors by AGEB in parenthesis. Conley standard errors in brackets (5km). SFD arranges blocks by longitude,
then latitude, and subsequently uses the first-differences approach. Block-type controls include an urban block dummy and a block-type dummy. Agglomeration controls include: log distance to CBD, log population density, log distance to city limits. Geographic controls include: altitude, slope, minimum
temperature, maximum temperature, precipitation, and PM 2.5 concentration.

that only considers exclusively Mexico City (column 2, Table 6), and both the 2SLS and SFD-2SLS
estimates for the sample that only includes blocks within 5 kilometers of any Pueblo (columns 5 and 10,
Table 6). In most robustness checks, the estimates have the same sign and similar magnitudes, and they
are statistically significant at the five percent confidence level using both types of standard errors. Lastly,
for all robustness checks the value of the F-statistic is higher than 1,400, for the exception of the Mexico
City-only sample. In the latter case, the value of the statistic is 120, above all the thresholds suggested
by the applied econometrics literature (Lee et al., 2020; Olea & Pflueger, 2013; Stock & Yogo, 2005).
The first exception was one of the estimates for the Mexico City-only sample. Although the 2SLS estimates
are imprecisely estimated using both types of standard errors, the SFD-2SLS estimates are statistically
significant using either type of standard errors at the one percent significance level. The cause of this
might be related to the uniquely high levels of density of Mexico City relative to other Mexican cities,
which could increase the importance of unobserved spatially correlated heterogeneity.
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The second exception is related to the 5-kilometer buffer sample (columns 5 and 10, Table 6). The
magnitudes are smaller than other robustness checks, although the sign does not change. Also, the
estimates are more imprecise when we use Conley standard errors. The smaller size of the estimates is
logical since we constrain our sample to blocks close to Pueblos de Indios. As we explain in section 4.2,
the use of Conley standard errors implies clusters of groups of blocks that can be quite different since
they comprise several official geostatistical units (AGEBs) designed by Mexico’s statistical agency in the
Census. Once we consider our preferred standard errors, clustered at the AGEB level, the estimates are
statistically significant at the one percent significance level. From our point of view, this is the most
important robustness check since we still find effects of colonial segregation on sorting, even if we only
consider blocks that are very close to Pueblos de Indios. Intuitively, these are the blocks more likely to
experience the influence of the persistent effects of colonial segregation.
Given the results of our robustness checks, we can thus confidently say that the Pueblos de Indios
segregation policy created agglomerations of poverty at high levels of granularity. If this colonial policy
treated a granular region, and commercial or labor relations did not alter such treatment, it remained
with low living standards three centuries later.
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6
6.1

Mechanisms
Not the originally targeted group

We explore whether Indigenous-Only Pueblos leads to modern agglomerations of the Indigenous population in nearby blocks. We use all four methodologies, which allows us to test whether the persistence of
the agglomeration of Indigenous individuals around the formerly segregated Pueblos drives our results.
We show estimates of regressions that consider the complete set of controls in Table 7.
Indeed the independence of Mexico in 1821 eliminated the colonial institution of Pueblo de Indios and the
caste system. Nevertheless, there is evidence in the economics literature that discrimination against Indigenous individuals persists in Mexico (Arceo-Gomez & Campos-Vazquez, 2014, 2015). Political science
literature documents that Mexican intellectuals in the 20th century created a national identity arguing
that all Mexicans were Mestizos and hence multiracial (Trejo & Altamirano, 2016). Nevertheless, this
national identity de facto hid the discrimination and bias faced by the native population in Mexico
(Woo-Mora, 2020).
The direction and size of all our estimates indicate that the blocks matched to Indigenous-Only Pueblos
have a lower share of Indigenous individuals relative to urban blocks near Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos.
The SFD-2SLS estimate suggests that the impact is minus 8.7 percent in our main specification. The
direction of this estimate is similar to our OLS, SFD, and 2SLS estimates. The absolute size of SFD-2SLS
estimates is greater than OLS and SFD ones, but similar to our 2SLS estimates.
Unlike the main results, the inference depends on the choice of standard errors. The clustered standard
errors at the AGEB level suggest a lower share of Indigenous people in blocks nearby the formerly
segregated Pueblos. The Conley standard errors suggest the impact is zero. The conclusion is clear, there
is no evidence that blocks near Indigenous-Only Pueblos have a higher share of Indigenous individuals
relative to urban blocks closer to Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos.
These results are surprising, and they reject the hypothesis that Indigenous-Only Pueblos showed a
historical persistence in the agglomeration of the Mexican native population. This result, although
staggering, must be considered in the context of the current demographics of the country. As of 2020,
only 6.1 percent of Mexico’s population spoke an Indigenous language. This number contrasts with the
share of Indigenous individuals in 1620, 80 percent of the colonial population. It is also relatively low
compared to the same share in 1800, 60 percent of the colonial population (Cook & Borah, 2021).
We conduct a similar analysis to estimate the causal impact of Indigenous-Only Pueblos on the share of
individuals who consider themselves Black or Afro-Mexican for nearby urban blocks. The results also
show that the impact is either negative or zero.
For us, this is one of the main contributions of our paper. Contrary to the United States, we find that
segregation policies create spatial agglomerations of poverty and long-term negative impacts on economic
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Table 7: Mechanisms: Agglomeration of ethnic groups
Indigenous share

Afro-origin share

OLS
(1)

SFD
(2)

2SLS
(3)

SFD-2SLS
(4)

OLS
(5)

SFD
(6)

2SLS
(7)

SFD-2SLS
(8)

1[Indigenous-Only Pueblo]

-0.009
(0.002)
[0.005]

-0.003
(0.001)
[0.003]

-0.084
(0.036)
[0.081]

-0.087
(0.019)
[0.063]

-0.004
(0.001)
[0.002]

-0.004
(0.001)
[0.002]

-0.003
(0.019)
[0.033]

-0.033
(0.014)
[0.025]

No. Obs.
Municipal FE
Block-type controls
Other agglomeration controls
Geographic controls

514,871
X
X
X
X

466,005
X
X
X
X

514,871
X
X
X
X

466,005
X
X
X
X

443,362
X
X
X
X

345,530
X
X
X
X

443,362
X
X
X
X

345,530
X
X
X
X

Notes: Coefficients expressed in percentage points. Clustered standard errors by AGEB in parenthesis. Conley standard errors in brackets (5km). SFD arranges blocks by longitude, then latitude, and subsequently uses the first-differences approach. Block-type controls include an urban block dummy and a block-type dummy. Other agglomeration controls include: log distance to CBD, log population density, log distance to city limits. Geographic controls include: altitude, slope, minimum temperature, maximum temperature, precipitation,
and PM 2.5 concentration.

outcomes, even though the racial and ethnic demographic composition of the areas treated in the past
completely changed.

6.2

Potential Mechanism: Migration

We explore another potential mechanism, the relationship between Indigenous-Only Pueblos and city
immigrants. Two opposite economic forces define such a relationship. On one side, we expect that home
prices are lower in urban blocks near formerly segregated Pueblos. We expect this given the lower levels
of human capital and possibly lower housing quality. On the other side, in the presence of long-term
persistence, the urban blocks close to Pueblos with successful segregation are more likely to have more
individuals whose parents and grandparents also lived in these areas during previous decades. Such
persistence means that these blocks are less likely to have immigrants. Due to these two factors, the
impact of formerly segregated Pueblos on the level of city immigrants in nearby blocks can be either
positive or negative.
Mexico’s official statistical agency does not have an available dataset representative at the city level that
tracks all individuals across extended periods and in different neighborhoods29 . Hence, we are compelled
to use cross-sectional data from two questions in Mexico’s Census of 2020 about whether individuals
recently immigrated to the city (less than five years ago) or immigrated to the city long ago (immigrated
after they were born). We implement the same specification as in equation 1, but the left-hand side is
the share of migrants, both old and recent. We display our estimates in Table F.1.
We do not find conclusive evidence regarding the impact of Pueblos de Indios on the city immigrants. As
Table F.1 in Appendix F shows, the estimates of all different methods are not consistent for neither the
29

Mexico’s Life Family Survey tracks individuals, but the data is representative at the national level and the geolocation of individuals is anonymized due to ethical reasons.
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share of old migrants nor the share of recent migrants. The signs of the estimates and some magnitudes
are dissimilar across methods and measurements of city immigrants.

6.3

Potential Mechanism: Segregation Skin Tone

Our previous findings that Indigenous-Only Pueblos do not generate agglomerations of Mexican Indigenous and Afro-Mexican individuals are surprising. Given these results, we explore a different mechanism: urban segregation by skin tone. Economics and political science literature documents the presence of discrimination, disparities, and negative attitudes in the Mexican society towards Mestizos with
darker skin tones. These individuals typically have more Indigenous ancestry relative to other Mexicans (Arceo-Gomez & Campos-Vazquez, 2015, 2014; Campos-Vazquez & Medina-Cortina, 2019; MonroyGómez-Franco & Vélez-Grajales, 2020; Trejo & Altamirano, 2016; Woo-Mora, 2022).
We show in Table 8 the results of correlations between the skin tone of individuals and their closeness to
formerly segregated Pueblos. Due to data restrictions, we focus on a sample that exclusively considers
Mexico City without the metropolitan statistical area. One reason for this is that EMOVI’s sample is
representative at a state level but not at a MSA level. Similar to the urban block analysis, we build the
treatment by matching every individual to the closest Pueblo de Indios. In all our regressions, we use
the following controls: distance to the nearest Pueblo, distance to the central business district, sex, age,
migrant status, longitude, and latitude.
Columns 1 and 2 report the association between an individual’s skin tone according to the PERLA palette
(all categories, 1 to 11) and a dummy variable equal to 1 if we match the individual to an Indigenous-Only
Pueblo. Columns 3 and 4 analyze the association between being matched to a fully segregated Pueblo de
Indios and a dummy variable indicating whether the individual has a light skin tone (categories 1 to 3 in
the PERLA palette). Columns 5 and 6 repeat the previous analysis for a dummy equal to 1 if a person
in the sample has brown skin tones (categories 4 to 6 in the PERLA palette). Lastly, in columns 7 and
8, we report the analysis for an individual with the darkest skin tones of the palette (categories 8 to 11).
The colors corresponding to the PERLA palette categorical values and skin tones are in Appendix G.
We find that the association between the dummy variable of being matched to an Indigenous-Only Pueblo
and the number indicating skin color according to the PERLA palette is positive (column 1, Table 8).
Since a higher palette value represents a darker skin tone, this suggests that individuals with darker skin
tones tend to live closer to Indigenous-Only Pueblos. The association is positive but imprecisely estimated
using both types of standard errors. Our results confirm that individuals with fair and brown skin tone
tend to not live near former Pueblos de Indios where colonial segregation of natives was successful
(columns 2 and 3, Table 8).
The result that help us understand our skin tone mechanism is that the association between the dummy
variable for Indigenous-Only Pueblo and the dummy variable indicating a dark skin tone is positive and
statistically significant at the five percent significance level (columns 7 and 8, Table 8). To understand
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Table 8: Skin tone
PERLA scale

1[Fair skin tone]

1[Brown skin tone]

1[Dark skin tone]

OLS
(1)

SFD
(2)

OLS
(3)

SFD
(4)

OLS
(5)

SFD
(6)

OLS
(7)

SFD
(8)

1[Indigenous-Only Pueblo]

0.015
(0.141)
[0.078]

0.184
(0.116)
[0.095]

-0.015
(0.031)
[0.012]

-0.012
(0.025)
[0.019]

-0.008
(0.041)
[0.008]

-0.027
(0.032)
[0.017]

0.023
(0.023)
[0.028]

0.039
(0.023)
[0.020]

Dist. to nearest Pueblo (log)

0.006
(0.020)
[0.017]

-0.020
(0.021)
[0.020]

-0.007
(0.005)
[0.004]

0.001
(0.006)
[0.003]

0.016
(0.007)
[0.008]

0.011
(0.008)
[0.007]

-0.010
(0.004)
[0.005]

-0.012
(0.005)
[0.006]

3,114
0.219
0.036
X
X
X
X

3,110
0.107
0.031
X
X
X
X

3,114
0.200
0.007
X
X
X
X

3,110
0.082
0.008
X
X
X
X

3,114
0.179
0.005
X
X
X
X

3,110
0.077
0.004
X
X
X
X

3,114
0.163
0.020
X
X
X
X

3,110
0.085
0.018
X
X
X
X

Num.Obs.
R2
R2 Within
AGEB FE
All agglomeration controls
Socio-demographic controls
Geographic controls

Notes: Clustered standard errors by AGEB in parenthesis. Conley standard errors in brackets (5km). SFD arranges individuals by longitude, then latitude, and subsequently uses the first-differences approach. Agglomeration controls include: log of distance to nearest Pueblo, log of distance to CBD, and dummy if the individual lives in a rural block within Mexico City. Sociodemographic controls include: sex, age and migrant status. Geographic controls include: longitude and latitude.

the importance of this finding, we highlight the results in section 7.1: the Indigenous-Only Pueblos have
a negative causal impact on the number of Indigenous individuals in city blocks.
The previous results combined suggest that the mechanism to understand the long-term adverse effects of
urban segregation on human capital and living conditions is not the persistent agglomeration of Indigenous
inhabitants. Two facts reinforce this: 90 percent of Mexicans do not consider themselves Indigenous, and
half the Indigenous population lives in towns with fewer than 2,500 people. Hence, our findings show
that the urban segregation and sorting was “ transmitted” throughout centuries from Indigenous to
Mestizos with dark skin tone. In Mexico, Indigenous individuals were actively discriminated against and
segregated after colonial times. Mexican Governments in the 19th century actively tried to reduce the
share of Indigenous individuals, (Trejo & Altamirano, 2016), and governments in the early 20th century
considered that Indigenous communities blocked the progress of Mexico (Wolf, 1964). Our findings suggest
that as the share of the Indigenous population became very small in terms of the overall population, the
Mexican society “transmitted” segregation to multiracial individuals with dark skin in Mexican society.

6.4

Potential Mechanims: Economic Mobility

We explore our final potential mechanism, economic mobility. We also use data from the socioeconomic
mobility survey. Specifically, the survey contains valuable information regarding the wealth and education
of individuals and their parents. We implement rank-rank correlations. The dependent variable is the
rank of the wealth or education of individuals in the survey. The independent variables are the rank of
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the education or wealth of their parents. These rank-to-rank correlations are similar to (Chetty et al.,
2014). We estimate the ranks based on age cohorts and using the data for Mexico City only, as in
(Monroy-Gómez-Franco & Vélez-Grajales, 2020). To test our mechanism, we add to the rank-to-rank
correlations a dummy variable whenever we match the individual to a formerly segregated Pueblo. We
report our results in Table 9.
Our results show that if an individual matches to a formerly segregated Pueblo, the intercepts of her
education and wealth ranks in the regressions are lower compared to individuals living near HeterogeneousAncestry Pueblos. The estimates indicate that an individual living near a formerly segregated Pueblos
has a lower wealth rank by minus 6.651 to minus 2.083 percentiles. Although the estimates for education
are negative and sizable, they are imprecisely estimated using both types of standard errors. Hence, for
an individual to eliminate the penalty of living near Indigenous-Only Pueblos, she would need to have
parents with higher wealth rank by 5.99 to 7.58 percentiles.30
The interpretation of these results is not causal. Nonetheless the estimates inform us on how historical
segregation policies influence the intergenerational persistence of human capital and wealth in Mexico
City. The economic mobility rank-rank regressions reported in the economics literature are not causal,
but we still present the SFD estimates that capture the unobserved spatially correlated heterogeneity.
Moreover, since the data from the EMOVI survey does not allow us to see in which neighborhood the
parents lived, we cannot distinguish between parents who lived near formerly segregated Pueblos and
those who did not. Furthermore, we cannot observe if the individuals moved into blocks near IndigenousOnly Pueblos or if they have lived in those blocks since birth.
Lastly, these results, combined with the skin tone mechanisms in the previous section, are consistent
with existing literature on Mexico’s economic mobility and skin tone. This literature shows that dark
skin tone Mexicans face a significant disadvantage in terms of intergenerational mobility relative to light
skin individuals (Monroy-Gómez-Franco & Vélez-Grajales, 2020). Our results suggest that historical
segregation policies can also influence the economic mobility of individuals living in Mexico City, the
country’s most dense and populated city.

30

We divide the penalty faced by an individual near a formerly segregated Pueblo de Indios by the slope of the rank-to2.083
= 5.47 to 6.651
= 17.37 for the case of wealth.
rank regressions, that is 0.381
0.383
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Table 9: Economic mobility

Percentile in distribution
Wealth

Education

OLS
(1)

SFD
(2)

OLS
(3)

SFD
(4)

Parents’ percentile in distribution

0.383
(0.021)
[0.027]

0.381
(0.021)
[0.028]

0.320
(0.021)
[0.026]

0.340
(0.021)
[0.023]

1[Indigenous-Only Pueblo]

-6.651
(2.944)
[2.123]

-2.083
(1.331)
[1.242]

-1.907
(3.377)
[2.467]

-2.576
(2.464)
[2.525]

3,114
0.470
0.147
X
X
X
X

3,110
0.466
0.140
X
X
X
X

3,114
0.411
0.118
X
X
X
X

3,110
0.258
0.152
X
X
X
X

No. Obs.
R2
R2 Within
AGEB FE
Other agglomeration controls
Socio-demographic controls
Geographic controls

Notes: Coefficients expressed in percentile points. Clustered standard errors by AGEB
in parenthesis. Conley standard errors in brackets (5km). SFD arranges individuals by
longitude, then latitude, and subsequently uses the first-differences approach. Agglomeration controls include: log of distance to nearest Pueblo, log of distance to CBD, and
rural dummy. Socio-demographic controls include: sex, age and migrant status. Geographic controls include: longitude and latitude.

7

Conclusion

In this paper we analyze the persistent effects of a colonial segregation policy on the urban structure and
the sorting of individuals. For our analysis, we take advantage of the historical fact that the segregation
policy had a mixed success, as historical records show.
We combine a novel instrumental variable with a state of the art econometric method to eliminate spatial
heterogeneity. This allow us to provide causal estimates of the impacts of the policy on education and
housing quality in blocks within Mexican cities. Our findings suggest that individuals with lower levels
of education who live in unfavorable housing conditions sorted themselves near settlements where the
policy was successful. This confirms that urban segregation policies can propagate throughout centuries.
The propagation mechanisms are different from the existing urban segregation literature. In our context,
the originally targeted ethno-racial group - Indigenous individuals - no longer lives around the settlements where segregation succeeded. Instead, a different group - descendants of Spanish and Indigenous
people with darker skin tones - sorts themselves around such settlements. We also document that these
39
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individuals face a penalty regarding intergenerational mobility
Our work faces two main limitations. First, due to the lack of historical data, it is not possible for us to
see the dynamic impacts for the period spanning the 18th to the 21st century. Second, we only observe
modern sorting patterns, for the year 2020. Hence, we cannot see if individuals or their ancestors moved
across locations affected by the colonial segregation policy. Therefore, we cannot study how people move
across neighborhoods over time.
Our results highlight the importance of public goods provision in cities and placed-based policies. The
reason for this is that in our context, education and quality of housing are related to urban policies,
and can only be improved via well-targeted public investments to alleviate social disparities generated
by segregation policies. Furthermore, placed-based policies often focus on depressed regions or cities, our
results highlight the need of a neighborhood approach.
Finally, this study suggests the importance of digitization and processing of historical records spanning
different decades or centuries in developing nations. This would allow us to understand the evolution of
the effects caused by past segregation policies.
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A

Aggregate results
Table A.1: Pueblos de Indios and Mexican municipalities (counties)
Mean Income
pc (log)

Food
Poverty (log)

Patrimonial
Poverty (log)

Consumption
Poverty (log)

Gini
Index (log)

Nightlights
pc (log)

1[Pueblo de Indios]

-0.179
(0.046)

0.272
(0.104)

0.153
(0.053)

0.236
(0.087)

-0.016
(0.014)

-0.269
(0.065)

Mean Dep. Var.
No. Obs.
R2 Adj.

2512.09
1220
0.293

0.27
1220
0.144

0.57
1220
0.102

0.35
1220
0.128

0.39
1220
0.037

0.08
1220
0.163

Notes: Coefficients expressed as elasticities. Conley standard errors in parenthesis. Urban municipalities are those whose urbanization rate is equal or greater than the median national urbanization rate (43.37 percent). All specifications include (log) population
as control.

49
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4139140

B

Maps for Other Mexican Metropolitan Statistical Areas
Figure B.1: Pueblos de Indios in the MSA of Culiacan

Notes: Blue polygons represent all blocks (both rural and urban) within the MSA. Yellow triangles represent
Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos’ locations, while red dots indicate the location of Indigenous-Only Pueblos. The black
triangle represents the location of the central business district of the MSA, measured as the mean point in latitude and
longitude of all finance, real estate, insurance and banking establishments.
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Figure B.2: Pueblos de Indios in the MSA of Guadalajara

Notes: Blue polygons represent all blocks (both rural and urban) within the MSA. Yellow triangles represent
Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos’ locations, while red dots indicate the location of Indigenous-Only Pueblos. The black
triangle represents the location of the central business district of the MSA, measured as the mean point in latitude and
longitude of all finance, real estate, insurance and banking establishments.
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Figure B.3: Pueblos de Indios in the MSA of San Luis Potosı́

Notes: Blue polygons represent all blocks (both rural and urban) within the MSA. Yellow triangles represent
Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos’ locations, while red dots indicate the location of Indigenous-Only Pueblos. The black
triangle represents the location of the central business district of the MSA, measured as the mean point in latitude and
longitude of all finance, real estate, insurance and banking establishments.
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Figure B.4: Pueblos de Indios in the MSA of Toluca

Notes: Blue polygons represent all blocks (both rural and urban) within the MSA. Yellow triangles represent
Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos’ locations, while red dots indicate the location of Indigenous-Only Pueblos. The black
triangle represents the location of the central business district of the MSA, measured as the mean point in latitude and
longitude of all finance, real estate, insurance and banking establishments.
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Figure B.5: Pueblos de Indios in the MSA of Puebla-Tlaxcala

Notes: Blue polygons represent all blocks (both rural and urban) within the MSA. Yellow triangles represent
Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos’ locations, while red dots indicate the location of Indigenous-Only Pueblos. The black
triangle represents the location of the central business district of the MSA, measured as the mean point in latitude and
longitude of all finance, real estate, insurance and banking establishments.
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Figure B.6: Pueblos de Indios in the MSA of Tuxtla Gutierrez

Notes: Blue polygons represent all blocks (both rural and urban) within the MSA. Yellow triangles represent
Heterogeneous-Ancestry Pueblos’ locations, while red dots indicate the location of Indigenous-Only Pueblos. The black
triangle represents the location of the central business district of the MSA, measured as the mean point in latitude and
longitude of all finance, real estate, insurance and banking establishments.
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C

Instrument robustness
Table C.1: Instrument Robustness
Dist. to MSA’s boundary (log)
(1)

(2)

(3)

Dist. to CBD (log)

0.215
(0.001)
[0.036]

0.003
(0.041)
[0.025]

0.086
(0.043)
[0.033]

Dist. to city limits (log)

0.895
(0.001)
[0.058]

0.693
(0.110)
[0.058]

0.618
(0.114)
[0.086]

Num.Obs.
R2 Adj.
R2 Within
MSA FE
Municipal FE

566260
0.490

566260
0.717
0.201
X

566260
0.805
0.097
X

Notes: Coefficients expressed in elasticities. Clustered standard errors
by AGEB in parenthesis. Conley standard errors in brackets (5km).
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D

Spatial description of standard errors. Example: center of Mexico
City MSA
Figure D.1: Illustration of standard errors: clusters at the AGEB level vs. Conley

Notes: We build rings of 5-kilometer ratios around some Pueblos for illustration purposes only. We can observe that any
5-kilometer ratio can comprise multiple geostatistical units or AGEBs whose boundaries are in black. The AGEBs are
groups of similar blocks (with blue boundaries) with identical zoning laws and delimited by streets or avenues. The AGEB
is defined by Mexico’s official statistical agency using 2020 Census. The largest red and yellow circles represent
5-kilometer ratios around Pueblos de Indios of similar size to the ratio for our Conley standard errors. The black triangle
is the central business district of Mexico City MSA.
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E

Spatial First differences

Figure E.1: Intuition of identifying assumptions of Spatial First Differences Method vs. Cross-Sectional
Designs

Notes: These figures illustrate in a simple way the comparisons that two research designs exploit to identify causal
effects. The top level illustration provides a simplified idea of the identifying assumption for standard cross sectional
regressions. The lower level illustration shows in a simplified way the identifying assumption for spatial first differences.

F

Results: Robustness and Heterogeneity
Figure F.1: OLS heterogeneous effects by distance to nearest Pueblo: Years of schooling (z-score)

Notes: We split the blocks of our sample in twenty sub-samples of equal size. We create the vigintiles according to each
block’s distance to the nearest Pueblo de Indios. Then we proceed to implement our SFD-2SLS regressions for each
sub-sample following our main specification. We report confidence intervals at the 5 percent significance level for each
sub-sample. The thin vertical red lines with horizontal lines on the upper and lower bounds represent Conley standard
errors. The thick red lines represent clustered standard errors at the AGEB level.
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Figure F.2: OLS heterogeneous effects by distance to nearest Pueblo: People per room (z-score)

Notes: We split the blocks of our sample in twenty sub-samples of equal size. We create the vigintiles according to each
block’s distance to the nearest Pueblo de Indios. Then we proceed to run our SFD-2SLS regressions for each sub-sample
following our main specification. We report confidence intervals at the 5 percent significance level for each sub-sample.
The thin vertical red lines with horizontal lines on the upper and lower bounds represent Conley standard errors. The
thick red lines represent clustered standard errors at the AGEB level.

Figure F.3: SFD heterogeneous effects in a subset of Mexico’s Metropolitan Statistical Areas: Years of
schooling (z-score)

Notes: We report confidence intervals at the 5 percent significance level for each sub-sample using clustered standard
errors at the AGEB level.
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Figure F.4: SFD heterogeneous effects in a subset of Mexico’s Metropolitan Statistical Areas: People
per room (z-score)

Notes: We report confidence intervals at the 5 percent significance level for each sub-sample using clustered standard
errors at the AGEB level.

Table F.1: Mechanisms: Agglomeration of migrants
Old migrants share

Recent migrants share

OLS
(1)

SFD
(2)

2SLS
(3)

SFD-2SLS
(4)

OLS
(5)

SFD
(6)

2SLS
(7)

SFD-2SLS
(8)

1[Indigenous-Only Pueblo]

0.008
(0.003)
[0.007]

0.021
(0.002)
[0.006]

-0.069
(0.031)
[0.075]

0.316
(0.040)
[0.202]

-0.002
(0.001)
[0.002]

-0.004
(0.001)
[0.002]

-0.038
(0.011)
[0.026]

0.114
(0.015)
[0.071]

No. Obs.
Municipal FE
Block-type controls
Agglomeration controls
Geographic controls

514,871
X
X
X
X

466,005
X
X
X
X

514,871
X
X
X
X

466,005
X
X
X
X

443,362
X
X
X
X

345,530
X
X
X
X

443,362
X
X
X
X

345,530
X
X
X
X

Notes: Coefficients expressed in percentage points. Clustered standard errors by AGEB in parenthesis. Conley standard errors in
brackets (5km). SFD arranges blocks by longitude, then latitude, and subsequently uses the first-differences approach. Block-type controls include an urban block dummy and a block-type dummy. Agglomeration controls include: log distance to CBD, log population
density, and log distance to city limits. Geographic controls include: altitude, slope, minimum temperature, maximum temperature,
precipitation, average PM 2.5 concentration.
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G

Tones of PERLA Palette
Figure G.1: 11 skin tones of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (PERLA)

Notes: Category 1 corresponds to the fairest skin tone at the top, while Category 11 indicates the darkest skin tone at
the bottom.
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